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Recent published articles by affiliated faculty


Administrative Collusion: 
How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress

Neomi Rao
90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1463 (2015)

This Article identifies a previously unexplored problem with the delegation of legislative power by focusing not on the discretion given to executive agencies, but instead on how delegations allow individual congressmen to control administration. Delegations create administrative discretion, discretion that members of Congress can influence through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. Members have persistent incentives for delegation to agencies, because it is often easier to serve their interests through shaping administration than by passing legislation. To understand the particular problem of delegation, I introduce the concept of the “collective Congress.” Collective decisionmaking is a fundamental characteristic of the legislative power. The collective Congress serves an important separation of powers principle by aligning the ambitions of legislators with the power of Congress as an institution. Although members represent distinct interests, the Constitution allows members of Congress to exercise power only collectively and specifically precludes them from exercising any type of individual or executive power. Delegation, however, provides opportunities for individual legislators to influence administration and poses a serious separation of powers concern by fracturing the collective Congress. This insight undermines the conventional view that delegations will be self-correcting because Congress will jealously guard its lawmaking power from the executive. Instead, members of Congress will often prefer to collude and to share administrative power with the executive. As a result, delegation destroys the Madisonian checks and balances against excessive delegation. This structural failure suggests a need to reconsider judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine and to implement political reforms to realign Congress with its collective power.


Administrative Law Without Congress

Michael Greve
22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 501 (2015)

Administrative law has ceased to respond adequately to the challenges posed by modern-day executive government. We suggest that the discordance reflects a mismatch between the debilities of the Congress and an administrative regime built on legislative supremacy.Administrative law — in its New Deal and its modern, post-Chevron forms — presuppose a Congress that is jealous of its legislative powers. However, the modern Congress has increasingly dis-empowered itself. It consistently fails to update old statutes even when they are manifestly outdated or, as actually administered, have assumed contours that neither the enacting nor the current Congress would countenance. When Congress does legislate, it tends to enact highly convoluted and often incoherent “hyper-legislation.”

We examine the effects first on agencies, and then on courts and their doctrines. Knowing that there is no turning (back) to Congress, agencies are tempted to improvise policies lacking legislative authority. In turn, administrative law doctrines that were developed under very different institutional conditions start to bend.

We describe three increasingly common forms of agency action: (1) agency “re-writes” of statutes; (2) procedural shell games and manipulation; and (3) broad regulatory waivers without or in excess of a statutory warrant. We provide illustrations in the “old statutes” and “hyper-legislation” settings. Our principal old-statute example is the Clean Air Act and the protracted litigation over the EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases, culminating (for now) in the Supreme Court’s decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. Our principal examples of hyper-legislation are the Dodd-Frank Act and the Affordable Care Act, including the pending litigation over the scope of the act’s subsidy and mandate provisions.

We conclude with a plea for more institutional realism and less interpretive metaphysics in administrative law.