

Beyond Seminole Rock

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Seminole Rock deference—which requires courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations—may be living on borrowed time. Although it might seem harmless, many worry that *Seminole Rock* violates the maxim that the same hands should not both make and interpret the law. Indeed, the fear is that this combination of powers may create incentives for agencies that value flexibility to promulgate ambiguous rules whose meaning they can later clarify retroactively, to the detriment of regulated parties who lack notice regarding their legal obligations. The upshot is that several Justices of the Supreme Court have called for *Seminole Rock* to be revisited.

What has been overlooked, however, is that overruling *Seminole Rock* would have unintended consequences. This is so because another case, *Chenery II*, enables agencies to put parties in a similar bind simply by not promulgating rules at all. Under *Chenery II*, an agency has discretion whether to promulgate industry-wide rules or instead to give meaning to statutes by case-by-case adjudication. Because the doctrines are substitutes for each other, albeit imperfect substitutes, if the Court were to overrule *Seminole Rock*, agencies that place a high value on their own future flexibility could achieve it by pivoting to *Chenery II*. Yet for regulated parties, this could be worse than the status quo because even an ambiguous rule generally provides more notice than an open-ended statute. Equally troublesome, because overruling *Seminole Rock* would discourage rulemaking, it would reduce public participation in the regulatory process.

The insight that *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II* are interconnected—meaning what happens to one affects the other—counsels in favor of *stare decisis*. Importantly, however, if the Supreme Court is inclined to overrule *Seminole Rock*, it should also revisit aspects of *Chenery II* to prevent problematic substitution. For instance, the Court could begin affording *Skidmore* rather than *Chevron* deference to statutory interpretations announced in adjudications and could also bolster fair notice. Absent such revisions, overruling *Seminole Rock* may harm the very people the Justices hope to help.

Because Chenery establishes the right to forgo rulemaking altogether, the agency’s ability to flesh out an imprecise or vague rule through adjudication arguably only gives the agency discretion that it already has.

Professor John Manning¹

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¹ John F. Manning, *Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules*, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 665 (1996).

This decision is an ominous one to those who believe that men should be governed by laws that they may ascertain and abide by, and which will guide the action of those in authority as well as of those who are subject to authority.

Justice Robert Jackson²

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² S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 217 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

INTRODUCTION

The days of *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*³ may be numbered. At least as it has come to be understood, *Seminole Rock* commands courts to defer to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.⁴ Such deference may sound innocent. After all, who knows better than the agency that drafted them what its own regulations mean? And, in any event, shouldn't the same sort of pragmatic administrability and accountability notions that underlie *Chevron*⁵ apply with at least equal force when it comes to interpreting regulations? Yet the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has questioned this deference.⁶ Indeed, the Court cast doubt on *Seminole Rock* in a majority opinion in 2012.⁷ And just last year, Justice Sonia Sotomayor writing for the Court "expressed clear reservations about *Seminole Rock*."⁸ Nor is this skepticism limited to the judiciary. Prominent scholars like John Manning and Matthew Stephenson have also called for *Seminole Rock* to be overruled outright or at least better controlled.⁹

What is it about deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rules that triggers such reactions? It cannot be hostility to deference generally. *Chevron* deference, for instance, may have had no more forceful friend than the late Justice Antonin Scalia¹⁰—who also happened to be the Court's most

³ 325 U.S. 410 (1945).

⁴ See *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (restating *Seminole Rock*).

⁵ See generally *Chevron Inc. v. NRDC*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

⁶ See, e.g., *Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n*, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 (2015) (per Sotomayor, J.); *id.* at 1211 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment); *id.* at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); *Decker v. N.W. Env. Def. Ctr.*, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); *id.* at 1339–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting); *Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.*, 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also *Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala*, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

⁷ *Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012); see also Kevin M. Stack, *The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole Rock*, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 670 (2015) (noting the potential implications of *Christopher*).

⁸ Amy Wildermuth & Sanne H. Knudsen, *Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock*, 65 EMORY L. J. 47, 52 (2015) (citing *Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n*, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015)). Of course, this should not be overstated; although Justice Sotomayor did not wholeheartedly embrace *Seminole Rock*, neither did she call for it to be overruled. See *infra*

⁹ See Manning, *supra* note __; Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, *Seminole Rock's Domain*, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449 (2011) (rejecting some potential modifications and urging others).

¹⁰ See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, *Chevron's Mistake*, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 562 n.52 (2009) (noting that Scalia has been described as "*Chevron's* strongest defender") (internal alterations omitted) (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, *Chevron's Domain*, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 871–72 (2001)); see also *City of Arlington v. FCC*, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (per Scalia, J.); *United States v. Mead Corp.*, 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

vocal critic of *Seminole Rock*.¹¹ Nor are *Seminole Rock*'s detractors driven by distrust of rulemaking. Justice Clarence Thomas has questioned whether notice-and-comment rulemaking is always (or even often) constitutional,¹² but the rest of the Court accepts it, even while questioning other aspects of the administrative state.¹³ Why then the animosity for *Seminole Rock*?

The reason is that many have come to believe that *Seminole Rock* is uniquely problematic. With *Chevron*, one actor—Congress—makes the law while another actor—an agency—interprets it. But with *Seminole Rock*, the same actor—an agency—makes law and then interprets the very law it made.¹⁴ This unilateralism, many fear, creates incentives for regulators to promulgate “vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”¹⁵ In other words, the worry is that agencies that do not want to pin themselves today down (i.e., agencies that value having options going forward) may seize such flexibility for themselves by promulgating an ambiguous rule. Indeed, in this way *Seminole Rock* may “contravene[] one of the great rules of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”¹⁶ As John Manning has explained, the maxim that the “same hands” who make the law must not determine what it means has a pedigree going all the way back to “Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone” and was endorsed during the constitutional founding.¹⁷ Accordingly, walking back from *Seminole Rock* may encourage “self-restraint” on the part of regulators—thus upholding “a separation of powers tradition designed to promote government by law and limit government by discretion.”¹⁸ For such reasons, Justice Thomas has aggressively called for *Seminole Rock* to be overruled and others on the Court have suggested their willingness to consider the issue.¹⁹

¹¹ See, e.g., *Decker v. N.W. Env. Def. Ctr.*, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339–42 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹² See *Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs.*, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); *Michigan v. EPA*, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).

¹³ See, e.g., *City of Arlington v. FCC*, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

¹⁴ See, e.g., *Decker v. N.W. Env. Def. Ctr.*, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹⁵ *Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala*, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

¹⁶ *Decker*, 133 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also *id.* (“[T]he power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest in the same hands.”) (citing *MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS* bk. XI, ch. 6, pp. 151-152 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent transl. 1949)).

¹⁷ Manning, *supra* note ___, at 644-45 (collecting citations).

¹⁸ *Id.* at 646-47.

¹⁹ See *infra* ___.

At the same time, of course, others have argued that *Seminole Rock* should not be overruled. For instance, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule contend that nothing in the Constitution or statutory law forbids *Seminole Rock* and that, in fact, this form of deference is both good law and policy.²⁰ Nor is retroactivity necessarily fatal; indeed, Congress *already* sometimes authorizes retroactive rulemaking.²¹ Moreover, there are other examples of the “same hands” both creating and applying legal rules.²² And finally, even assuming *Seminole Rock* may allow agencies to promulgate skeletal rules that can be fleshed out later,²³ should that possibility overcome *stare decisis*? Suffice it to say, who has the better of the spirited fight over the merits of *Seminole Rock* is a question that may be decided by the Supreme Court.

What has been overlooked, however, is that there is another reason why overruling *Seminole Rock* might be a mistake: doing so may harm the very people the Justices hope to help. The reality is that agencies that value flexibility can obtain it either by promulgating an ambiguous rule (hence the criticism of *Seminole Rock*), or, instead, by falling back on another venerable administrative law precedent: the Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in *SEC v. Chenery*.²⁴ In terms of providing notice of legal obligations to regulated parties, however, this latter precedent—dubbed *Chenery II*²⁵—is worse than *Seminole Rock*. The consequence is that overruling *Seminole Rock* may do more harm than good, even on *Seminole Rock*’s critics own terms.

To see why overruling *Seminole Rock* would create this unintended consequence, it is important to understand *Chenery II*. *Chenery II* also represents a “fundamental principle of administrative law”²⁶—that agencies

²⁰ See Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, *The Unbearable Rightness of Auer* (forthcoming). See also Gillian E. Metzger, *Embracing Administrative Common Law*, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (2012) (explaining that many criticisms of *Seminole Rock* reflect “free-floating normative and functional concerns” without a tie to the statutory text).

²¹ See, e.g., Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting Congress authorized retroactive rulemaking), rehearing denied 643 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“An agency may not promulgate retroactive rules *absent express congressional authority*.”) (emphasis added) (citing *Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.*, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)); 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b) (explicitly authorizing retroactive rulemaking).

²² See, e.g., Jason Marisam, *Constitutional Self-Interpretation*, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 307-29 (2014) (listing many examples of self-interpretation including impeachment hearings, federal common law, and federal rules of procedure).

²³ See, e.g., *Stephenson & Pogoriler*, *supra* note __, at 1494.

²⁴ *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

²⁵ Kevin M. Stack, *The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery*, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 961 n.27 (2007).

²⁶ Stack, *supra* note __, at 961 n.27; see also M. Elizabeth Magill, *Agency Choice of Policymaking Form*, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1405 (2004) (“The core of the principle that an

can choose to interpret the statutes they administer by promulgating rules or, if they prefer, by simply enforcing the statutes directly after the fact through case-by-case adjudication.²⁷ For instance, as in *Chenery II* itself, if a statute commands companies to act in “fair and equitable” ways consistent with “the public interest,” the agency tasked with administering that law can choose to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking to prospectively define what that statutory obligation means, or, instead, can retroactively apply the statute against a regulated party in an “ad hoc” enforcement proceeding, thereby also defining what the statute means.²⁸ This discretionary power to create policy either through rulemaking or adjudication often makes sense.²⁹ Sometimes, for instance, statutes themselves are reasonably clear so there is no need for a regulation. Nonetheless, despite its utility, *Chenery II* can be dangerous because “ad hoc” adjudication may not provide regulated parties with enough notice of their legal duties, thus raising fair notice concerns.³⁰

Put these pieces together and the following picture emerges: *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II* are “substitute” doctrines, at least for agencies that place a high value on retaining future flexibility. *Ex ante*, an agency seeking to preserve flexibility for itself faces a choice: Should it promulgate an ambiguous rule (for which it can receive deference) or instead not promulgate a rule at all but simply wait to bring an enforcement action under the statute? To be sure, the two doctrines are not *perfect* substitutes. Both have strengths and weaknesses, and all else being equal, such agencies may prefer one to the other. Even so, as tools, they are *imperfect* substitutes³¹; if push comes to shove, either *can* do the trick. Because the two doctrines are substitutes, it follows that adjudication (under *Chenery II*) would become more attractive if rulemaking were to become less attractive.³² This substitution insight matters because overruling *Seminole Rock* would make rulemaking less attractive to an agency seeking to preserve flexibility for itself. Ultimately, whether agencies in a post-*Seminole Rock* world would substitute away from ambiguous rules to clearer rules (the intended consequence) or no rules at all

agency is free to choose its policymaking form was established long ago.”); Glen O. Robinson, *The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform*, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 486 (1970).

²⁷ See *Chenery*, 332 U.S. at 203; see also *NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC*, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining the importance of *Chenery II*).

²⁸ *Chenery*, 332 U.S. at 204 (citations omitted).

²⁹ See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver & Linda D. Jellum, *Chenery II and the Development of Federal Administrative Law*, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 815, 816 (2006).

³⁰ See, e.g., *id.* at 217 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

³¹ See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, *Why (Ever) Define Markets?*, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010) (distinguishing between perfect and imperfect substitutes).

³² See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, *ECONOMICS* 407 (1993) (explaining imperfect substitutes).

(the unintended consequence) is an empirical question that requires understanding an agency's "cross-elasticity of demand."³³ Until the Justices have a good sense of how agencies would respond if *Seminole Rock* were no longer on the table, however, they need to know that overruling *Seminole Rock* may encourage the latter rather than the former. If the critics of *Seminole Rock* are correct, moreover, that agencies behave in strategic ways, then their reason to fear substitution to adjudication should be especially strong.

Unfortunately, creating incentives for agencies that value future flexibility to make policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking would often put regulated parties in a worse position than they are in now. With or without *Seminole Rock*, such parties confront open-ended obligations. But even ambiguous rules provide at least *some* prospective notice of those obligations. Retroactive adjudication under the statute, by contrast, often does not. Yet if *Seminole Rock* were to be overruled, agencies may cease to engage in such rulemaking, or at least may do so less frequently, because rulemaking would become relatively less effective for preserving flexibility. Thus, overruling *Seminole Rock* would encourage agencies to substitute adjudication for rulemaking, with the result being less overall notice. Equally bad, if a flexibility-valuing agency in a post-*Seminole Rock* world *did* elect to provide notice, such notice would be more likely to come through informal paths like guidance documents, because such informal paths also provide flexibility to agencies. Yet regulated parties value the structured process that notice-and-comment rulemaking provides.³⁴ According, overruling *Seminole Rock* may, on one hand, lead to less notice overall or, on the other, to a less participatory regulatory process. Either outcome may be worse than the *status quo*.

The question is what to do? One answer may be "nothing." The fact that overruling *Seminole Rock* would have unintended consequences cuts in favor of *stare decisis*. Because overruling *Seminole Rock* could actually make things worse, perhaps the Court should leave well enough alone on the theory that the first precept of *stare decisis*, like medicine, is "do no harm."³⁵ Indeed, at least for those agency contexts governed by *Chenery II* (i.e., those in which an agency can choose between rulemaking and adjudication), overruling *Seminole Rock* may be worse than doing nothing.³⁶

³³ See, e.g., DAVID BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 206-08 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining cross-elasticity).

³⁴ See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, *Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?*, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1312 (1992) ("With one exception, the answer to the question in the title is 'no.'"). Guidance documents are other informal devices are discussed below. See *infra* ____.

³⁵ Cf. *Kimble v. Marvel Entm't LLC*, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).

³⁶ As discussed in this Article, some regulatory contexts are not governed by *Chenery II*

But there is another option. In particular, as part of revisiting *Seminole Rock*, the Court could also revise aspects of *Chenery II*. It would not be necessary, moreover, to overrule all of *Chenery II* to prevent its misuse; indeed, overruling *Chenery II* would itself have unintended consequences.³⁷ Even so certain modifications to the *Chenery II* framework could mitigate the most problematic consequences of overruling *Seminole Rock*.

First, for the same sorts of reasons that the Court is concerned about *Seminole Rock*, the Justices could hold that *Skidmore* rather than *Chevron* deference should apply to statutory interpretations announced in adjudication.³⁸ Switching to *Skidmore* deference would encourage agencies to engage in rulemaking. Under *Chevron*, courts “must accept an agency’s ‘reasonable’ interpretation of a gap or ambiguity in a statute the agency is charged with administering,” whereas under *Skidmore*, courts decide what the statute means while considering “the ‘thoroughness evident in the [agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”³⁹ In other words, unlike *Chevron* deference, *Skidmore* deference is “nonbinding.”⁴⁰ Shifting to this lesser form of deference would allow agencies to continue to set policy in adjudication, but only if their reading of the statute can be sustained without *Chevron* deference. Otherwise, they will have to promulgate a rule.

And second, as it has begun to do with regards to *Seminole Rock*, the Court could clarify and more vigorously enforce the fair notice doctrine—i.e., the idea that agencies cannot *retroactively* impose legal obligations on regulated parties when doing so is sufficiently unfair.⁴¹ At a minimum, the

because Congress has determined that no regulatory obligations exist until after the agency has promulgated a rule. *See infra* __. In that context, overruling *Seminole Rock* is more straightforward because there is no need to fear substitution effects. However, “[t]he typical agency ... can rely on the quasi-legislative process of rulemaking to flesh out its delegated authority” or “use its power to adjudicate cases (in the first instance) as a way of developing common law refinements of a broadly worded organic act.” John Manning, *Nonlegislative Rules*, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 895-96 (2004) [hereafter “Manning II”].

³⁷ *See, e.g., id.* 909-10 (detailing line-drawing problems).

³⁸ As discussed below, this revision may be especially attractive because agencies do not just write the open-ended *rules* they administer, but also sometimes the open-ended *statutes* they administer. *See, e.g.,* Jarrod Shobe, *Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting*, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014); Brigham Daniels, *Agency as Principal*, 48 GA. L. REV. 335, 340 (2014).

³⁹ Manning, *supra* note __, at 613, 618 (quoting *Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 844 (1984) and *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 142 (1944)).

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 686.

⁴¹ *See* *Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).

same fair notice doctrine should apply to agency interpretations of statutes as to agency interpretations of regulations—“the test for retroactivity” should not “be more stringent in the context of regulatory (as opposed to statutory) interpretation.”⁴² With these revisions, agencies would still have discretion whether to promulgate rules or engage in adjudication, the core of *Chenery II*, but at least at the margins, they would have to pay greater attention to retroactivity and hue more closely to the statute if they forego rulemaking.

In short, because *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II* are substitutes, if the Court were to overrule *Seminole Rock*, agencies more often would turn to *Chenery II*. This is so because *Seminole Rock* does not exist in a vacuum but rather is part of an interconnected network of administrative law doctrines. When one part of the network is changed, that change reverberates across administrative law. Prudence suggests that Supreme Court should understand those interconnected consequences *before* changing important doctrines.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by explaining the *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II* doctrines. Part II, in turn, demonstrates how substitution works in this context. Although they are only imperfect substitutes, both rulemaking and adjudication can be used to achieve the same policy ends, especially for agencies that place a high value on flexibility. Part III then demonstrates why this substitution would increase if *Seminole Rock* were overruled and explains why that may be worse than the status quo. Finally, Part IV offers a path forward by explaining how principles already present in existing law may allow the Supreme Court to retain *Chenery II*'s core while taming the most problematic substitution that would occur if *Seminole Rock* were overruled.

I. SETTING THE STAGE

The 1940s was a momentous decade for administrative law.⁴³ Most notably, of course, in 1946, Congress—persuaded that administrative “power was not sufficiently safeguarded and sometimes was put to arbitrary and biased use”⁴⁴—enacted the Administrative Procedure Act,⁴⁵ the “bill of rights for the new regulatory state.”⁴⁶ The APA, however, is only a part of the story.

⁴² Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1479 (collecting cases).

⁴³ See, e.g., Aaron Nielson, *Visualizing Change in Administrative Law*, 49 GA. L. REV. 757, 768-69 (2015); George B. Shepherd, *Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics*, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1557 (1996).

⁴⁴ *Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath*, 339 U.S. 33, 37 (1950)

⁴⁵ See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012).

⁴⁶ Shepherd, *supra* note __, at 1558.

The 1940s also saw the Court recognize *Skidmore* deference,⁴⁷ retreat from aggressive enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine,⁴⁸ expand the constitutional scope of what agencies can regulate,⁴⁹ and give birth to the duty of contemporaneous explanation.⁵⁰ All of these developments are bedrocks of modern administrative law.

For purpose of this Article, however, two 1940s precedents are essential: *Seminole Rock* (decided in 1945) and *Chenery II* (decided in 1947). Both decisions grant agencies substantial discretion, albeit in ways that seem very different. Under *Seminole Rock*, agencies receive deference when interpreting ambiguities in their own regulations. And under *Chenery II*, agencies have discretion whether to give meaning to the statutes they administer through notice-and-comment rulemaking or through case-by-case adjudication. Both decisions have been applied countless times by agencies. Strangely, however, only *Seminole Rock* has come under increased scrutiny in recent years.

A. The Emergence of *Seminole Rock* Deference

The Supreme Court in 1945 almost certainly did not intend to create what is now called *Seminole Rock* deference.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the Court's decision has to come to stand for an important doctrine: an agency's interpretations of its "own regulations" is "controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,'"⁵² meaning an agency interpreting rules can expect to receive judicial deference equal to or perhaps even greater than the deference they receive under *Chevron* when interpreting statutes.⁵³ The story of how this expectation came to be is worth briefly recalling.

The facts in *Seminole Rock* involved a price-control regime administered by the Office of Price Administration—in particular, the Price Division of the office. The agency issued "General Max" regulations that "attempt[ed] to institute a general price freeze on 'thousands of commodities and millions of buyers and sellers to achieve the same intensive analysis of individual cases

⁴⁷ *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

⁴⁸ *See Yakus v. United States*, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); *see also* James R. Conde & Michael Greve, *Yakus and the Administrative State* (forthcoming).

⁴⁹ *See Wickard v. Filburn*, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

⁵⁰ *See SEC v. Chenery Corp.*, 318 U.S. 80 (1943).

⁵¹ *See* Amy Wildermuth & Sanne H. Knudsen, *Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock*, 65 EMORY L. J. 47, 52 (2015).

⁵² *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (quoting *Seminole Rock*, 325 U.S. at 414).

⁵³ *See, e.g.*, WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 392 (4th ed. 2010) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of its own regulations may receive stronger deference than its interpretation of a statutory provision.").

and the same detailed application of criteria that are feasible under narrower ceilings over fewer items.”⁵⁴ To ensure coordination, OPA began providing official interpretations of these regulations. The question in *Seminole Rock* was whether those interpretations were entitled to deference. In particular, OPA “sought to enjoin Seminole Rock & Sand Company from violating the Emergency Price Control Act” by charging too much for crushed rock, in violation of “the General Max regulations, which stated ‘each seller shall charge no more than the prices which he charged during the selected base period of March 1 to 31, 1942.’”⁵⁵ The rules, however, were ambiguous: what if a company entered into a contract during March 1942 but did not deliver any goods until after March 1942? In upholding OPA’s order, the Supreme Court used language that has become the springboard for *Seminole Rock* deference.⁵⁶

As Amy Wildermuth and Sanne H. Knudsen have explained, for a long time *Seminole Rock* was limited to its narrow, price-control context. Nonetheless, courts eventually “began to shed, slowly and without much fanfare, the original contextual appreciation of *Seminole Rock* as a wartime relic.”⁵⁷ Indeed, the Supreme Court revisited *Seminole Rock* in *Udall v. Tallman* and held that *Seminole Rock* deference applies beyond price control.⁵⁸ Unsurprisingly, “*Tallman*’s influence in the lower courts became apparent fairly quickly.”⁵⁹

The high-water mark of *Seminole Rock* expansion is the Court’s 1997 decision in *Auer v. Robbins*.⁶⁰ There, Justice Scalia writing for a unanimous Court, deferred to an agency amicus brief filed in the very litigation at issue. With apparently no context-specific limitations, the Court explained that when a scheme “is a creature of the [agency’s] own regulations, [the agency’s] interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”⁶¹ In fact, so strong was the

⁵⁴ Wildermuth & Knudsen, *supra* note ___, at 57-58.

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 59.

⁵⁶ See *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945) (“Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt,” meaning “[t]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”).

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 70 (quoting *Boesche v. Udall*, 303 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1961), which in turn was quoting *SEC v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947)).

⁵⁸ 380 U.S. 1 (1965).

⁵⁹ Wildermuth & Knudsen, *supra* note ___, at 86.

⁶⁰ 519 U.S. 452 (1997).

⁶¹ *Id.* at 461 (quoting *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945)).

Court's restatement of the principle that today, the terms *Seminole Rock* and *Auer* deference are used interchangeably.⁶²

B. John Manning and the *Seminole Rock* Critics

About the same time, however, that *Auer* was decided, the intellectual tide began to change as scholars began questioning the idea that deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules is even benign, much less beneficial. The key player in the anti-*Seminole Rock* movement was John Manning, who argued that such deference violates separation-of-powers principles that protect against the creation of perverse incentives.

In 1996, Manning published what has become one of the most significant articles in modern administrative law: *Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules*. Indeed, so influential was this article that Manning appears to have almost single-handedly flipped Justice Scalia's view. Consider the contrast. In 1997, Scalia authored *Auer*, which embraced an expansive view of *Seminole Rock*. By 2013, however, Scalia—citing Manning's article—was openly calling for *Seminole Rock* to be overruled, explaining that “[f]or decades, and for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the authority to say what their rules mean.”⁶³

Manning's key insight was that *Seminole Rock* deference, unlike *Chevron* deference, only arises when the agency that promulgated a regulation also interprets it. *Chevron*, by contrast, involves one actor (an agency) interpreting what another actor (Congress) has done. According to Manning, allowing the same hands that have drafted a legal obligation to interpret what that obligation means raises separation-of-powers concerns. Indeed, no less an authority than Montesquieu explained that “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”⁶⁴ Blackstone echoed these sentiments,⁶⁵ and the framers of the U.S. Constitution “rejected the British practice of using the upper house of the legislature as a court of last resort.”⁶⁶

⁶² Kathryn A. Watts, *Rulemaking as Legislating*, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1037 n.207 (2015).

⁶³ *Decker v. N.W. Env. Def. Ctr.*, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also *id.* at 1341 (citing, *inter alia*, Manning, *supra* note ___).

⁶⁴ Manning, *supra* note ___, at 645 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 157 (Anne Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1768)).

⁶⁵ See *Decker*, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing BLACKSTONE, *supra* note ___, at 58).

⁶⁶ Manning, *supra* note ___, at 645 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).

Combining the lawmaking and law interpreting power, Manning observed, was not just theoretically problematic: “By providing the agency an incentive to promulgate imprecise and vague rules, *Seminole Rock* undercuts important deliberative process objectives of the APA, and it creates potential problems of inadequate notice and arbitrariness in the enforcement of agency rules.”⁶⁷

To be sure, this “bad incentive” argument is contested. Cass Sunstein, for instance, has argued that in his years of government service, he has never seen an agency intentionally promulgate a vague rule in order to obtain deference.⁶⁸ Yet even if the “strong” form of the argument is not true (i.e., agencies are intentionally promulgating ambiguous language for the strategic purpose of obtaining deference), it seems reasonable to think that agencies, like all other actors, sometimes accept ambiguous regulations because obtaining specificity requires more resources.⁶⁹ Agencies, like other rational actors, no doubt can breathe easier about making that trade-off because they know they will obtain deference when interpreting the rule.

Manning’s solution was to shift to *Skidmore* deference.⁷⁰ Likewise, Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler have proposed a number of checks.⁷¹ For instance, they explain the “pay me now or pay me later” worry that *Seminole Rock* creates, as agencies promulgate regulations that do not tackle the hard problems (and so the agency does not “pay” upfront), but then later the agency issues an interpretative rule to tackle those problems, even though interpretative rules are not subject to the same rigorous procedure (and so the agency does not “pay later” either).⁷² Although not urging that *Seminole Rock* be overruled, they argue that “courts should retain the antiplaceholder principle [i.e., the idea that there is no *Seminole Rock* deference for a regulation that parrots the statute or is “mush”], should strengthen anti-retroactivity limitations in the *Seminole Rock* context, [and] should reserve *Seminole Rock* deference for regulatory interpretations contained in formal orders (granting *Skidmore* respect to more informal interpretations).”⁷³

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 618;

⁶⁸ See Sunstein & Vermeule, *supra* note ____.

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, *The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter*, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 191 (1995) (“[M]any potential ambiguities ... are too costly to anticipate and eliminate.”); D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, *Fiduciary Discretion*, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 615 n.26 (2014) (similar); see also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, *Risk, Courts, and Agencies*, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1066 n.98 (1990) (noting agencies are subject to bounded rationality).

⁷⁰ See Manning, *supra* note ___, at 618.

⁷¹ See Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note ____.

⁷² *Id.* at 1464.

⁷³ *Id.* at 1504.

C. The Last Days of *Seminole Rock*?

Taking the baton from Manning and these other scholars, Justice Scalia and then later Justice Thomas have called for *Seminole Rock* to be overruled and other Justices have indicated a willingness to consider the question.

Justice Scalia fired the first shot in his short concurrence in 2011's *Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.*⁷⁴ The Federal Communications Commission filed an amicus brief arguing how its rules should be read.⁷⁵ Justice Thomas invoked *Auer* as a reason to defer to the agency.⁷⁶ Justice Scalia, however, wrote separately to explain that he “would reach the same result” even without *Seminole Rock* and to observe that “while I have in the past uncritically accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.”⁷⁷ Following that hint from Justice Scalia, scholars began reevaluating *Seminole Rock* and whether it should be overruled.⁷⁸

Importantly, Justice Scalia's thoughts were soon endorsed, at least in part, in a majority opinion of the Court. In 2012, the Court refused to afford *Seminole Rock* deference to an agency reinterpretation of its own regulations. The case was *Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, which concerned regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act interpreting the term “outside salesman.”⁷⁹ While litigation was pending, the Department of Labor filed an amicus brief arguing, contrary to past practice, that the term “encompasses pharmaceutical sales representatives whose primary duty is to obtain nonbinding commitments from physicians to prescribe their employer's prescription drugs in appropriate cases.”⁸⁰ The Court refused to defer to the agency's brief, explaining that doing so “would seriously undermine the principle that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the

⁷⁴ 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).

⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁶ *Id.* at 2261.

⁷⁷ *Id.* at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring).

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, *supra* note __; Cynthia Barmore, *Auer in Action: Deference after Talk America*, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813 (2015); Michael P. Healy, *The Past, Present, and Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations*, 62 KAN. L. REV. 633 (2014); Derek A. Woodman, Note, *Rethinking Auer Deference: Agency Regulations and Due Process Notice*, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1721 (2014); Conor Clarke, *The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock*, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 175 (2014); Kevin O. Leske, *Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to Agency Deference*, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227 (2013); Daniel Mensher, *With Friends Like These: The Trouble with Auer Deference*, 43 ENVTL. L. 849 (2013); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, *An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules*, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 517–19 (2011).

⁷⁹ 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012).

⁸⁰ *Id.*

conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.”⁸¹ The Court then declared that *Seminole Rock* “creates a risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that they can later interpret as they see fit.”⁸²

In 2013, Justice Scalia returned to *Seminole Rock*, but this time to urge that it be overruled. In *Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center*, the Court—with Justice Kennedy writing—granted *Seminole Rock* deference to an EPA interpretation because, unlike in *Christopher*, the agency’s interpretation was not “a change from prior practice or a post hoc justification adopted in response to litigation.”⁸³ Scalia, however, dissented because the agency’s reading was “not the most natural one” and, in his view, the Court should not accept a strained reading “simply because EPA says that it believes the unnatural reading is right.”⁸⁴ Importantly, the Chief Justice and Justice Alito agreed that *Seminole Rock* may warrant reevaluation.⁸⁵

Next, the entire Court (arguably) cast some doubt on *Seminole Rock* in *Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association*,⁸⁶ with two justices—Scalia and Thomas—announcing that *Seminole Rock* should be overruled. In *Perez*, the Court confronted the so-called *Paralyzed Veterans* doctrine, which required agencies—in the context of interpretative rules—to use notice-and-comment rulemaking before reinterpreting a rule.⁸⁷ The Court held that the *Paralyzed Veterans* doctrine “is contrary to the clear text” of the APA, since interpretative rules never have to go through notice and comment. *Seminole Rock*, however, made an appearance in the Court’s analysis. Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor rejected the notion that interpretative rules “have the force of law” even though “an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations may be entitled to deference” by explaining that *Seminole Rock* is not a blank check: “Even in cases where an agency’s interpretation receives *Auer* deference, however, it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given regulation means what the agency says. Moreover, *Auer* deference is *not an inexorable command in all cases*.”⁸⁸

⁸¹ *Id.* at 2167 (quoting *Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n*, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per Scalia, J.)).

⁸² *Id.* (citations omitted).

⁸³ *Decker v. N.W. Env’tl Defense Ctr*, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013).

⁸⁴ *Id.* at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

⁸⁵ *See id.* at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The issue is a basic one going to the heart of administrative law.”).

⁸⁶ 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).

⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 1208 n.4 (citing *Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012)) (emphasis added). *See also Wildermuth & Knudsen, supra* note __, at 51 (reading this statement as suggesting some concern with *Seminole Rock*).

Most recently, the Supreme Court in May 2016, following Justice Scalia's death, denied a certiorari petition asking the Court to overrule *Seminole Rock*.⁸⁹ Justice Thomas dissented, reiterating the same themes as in his prior opinions.⁹⁰ Some speculate that the Court will eventually reconsider *Seminole Rock*, perhaps when the Court again has nine justices.⁹¹

D. The Two-Part *Chenery* Saga

At around the same time that the 1940s Supreme Court was considering *Seminole Rock*, it was also addressing another important administrative law case: *Chenery*. To be more specific, it was considering two separate *Chenery* cases. Both *Chenery I* and *Chenery II* are pillars of administrative law, although pillars holding up very different propositions. *Chenery I* sets forth the principle that judicial review of agency action must be based on the reasons given by the agency.⁹² By contrast, *Chenery II* establishes that agencies have discretion whether to regulate by promulgating prospective regulations or case-by-case adjudications with retroactive effect.⁹³

1. *Chenery I*

During the late 1930s, a company called the Federal Water Service Corporation—the Supreme Court just called it “Federal”—sought permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission to reorganize. The SEC approved reorganization, but also ordered that “preferred stock” acquired by certain “officers, directors, and controlling stockholders” while reorganization plans were before the Commission could not “participate in the reorganization on an equal footing with all other preferred stock.”⁹⁴ The SEC issued this order under its statutory power to determine what is “fair and equitable” or

⁸⁹ See *United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible*, No. 15-861 (May 16, 2016).

⁹⁰ See *id.* (Thomas, J., dissenting).

⁹¹ See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, *Supreme Court Declines to Reconsider Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Regulations*, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 16, 2016), at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/16/supreme-court-declines-to-reconsider-deference-to-agency-interpretations-of-agency-regulations/>.

⁹² *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 318 U.S. 80, 89 (1943); see also Kevin M. Stack, *The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery*, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958-59 (2007); Merrick B. Garland, *Deregulation and Judicial Review*, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 526 (1985) (“The origins of the hard look doctrine can be traced to the Supreme Court’s holding in [the first] *SEC v. Chenery Corp.*”).

⁹³ *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); see also *NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC*, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining the importance of *Chenery II*).

⁹⁴ *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 318 U.S. 80, 81 (1943).

“detrimental to the public interest or the interests of investors.”⁹⁵ Unhappy, the affected shareowners sought judicial review.

Before the Supreme Court, Federal contended that the SEC erroneously applied common law principles. The Supreme Court agreed in an opinion authored by Justice Frankfurter that announced what has come to be known as the *Chenery I* principle: Although an appellate court can generally affirm a lower court for any reason supported in the record, when it comes to administrative, law, “[t]he grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.”⁹⁶ This means that if an agency says it is acting because of reason X, a court generally must vacate or remand the agency’s decision if reason X is not supportable, even though reason Y would be. Under *Chenery I*, it generally is not for a court to say that the agency was right for the wrong reasons.⁹⁷

Applying the *Chenery I* principle, the Court ruled against the SEC. It concluded that the supposed common law doctrine of fiduciary law invoked by the SEC simply did not exist, at least not in the context cited by the agency.⁹⁸ Thus, the SEC’s order could not stand.

The Court noted, however, that the SEC is not “bound by settled judicial precedents” in all instances and can “express[] a more sensitive regard for what is right and what is wrong.”⁹⁹ Yet “*before* transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied their usual business consequences, they must fall under the ban of some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of government authorized to prescribe such standards.”¹⁰⁰ Here, the Court observed that “Congress itself did not proscribe the respondents’ purchases of preferred stock in Federal. Established judicial doctrines do not condemn these transactions. Nor has the Commission, acting under the rule-making powers delegated to it by 11(e), promulgated new general standards of conduct.”¹⁰¹

Justice Black, joined by Justices Reed and Murphy, dissented because he believed the SEC *had* exercised its independent judgment and had not simply relied on common law principles.¹⁰² Moreover, he prophesied that the agency would simply change the labels, but not the outcome, of what it had done.¹⁰³

⁹⁵ *Id.* at 82.

⁹⁶ *Id.* at 87.

⁹⁷ *See* S.E.C. v. *Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).

⁹⁸ *See* S.E.C. v. *Chenery Corp.*, 318 U.S. 80, 89 (1943).

⁹⁹ *Id.* at 89.

¹⁰⁰ *Id.* at 92-93 (emphasis added).

¹⁰¹ *See id.* at 93 (emphasis added).

¹⁰² *Id.* at 97 (Black, J., dissenting).

¹⁰³ *Id.* at 99

Nor did Black believe that the SEC must act by rulemaking.¹⁰⁴ Rejecting the dissent’s arguments, however, the *Chenery I* majority remanded “for such further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be appropriate.”¹⁰⁵ Respondents thus appeared to have beaten the SEC.

2. *Chenery II*

After the Supreme Court’s remand, the stockholders sought enforcement of the initial plan. The SEC, however, would not relent. Instead, the agency reached the same result as in *Chenery I*, but for different reasons. Whereas the agency had initially relied on erroneous interpretations of judicial precedents, on remand it drew “heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility reorganizations” to conclude that regardless of what the common law required, this particular transaction still should be forbidden as contrary to the public interest.¹⁰⁶ The SEC thus determined that the transaction could not go through as respondents hoped—even though no law at the time of the stock purchases forbade such purchases and, in fact, the common law allowed them. Respondents successfully sought judicial review in the D.C. Circuit, which concluded that *Chenery I* “precluded such action by the Commission.”¹⁰⁷

This time, however, the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Murphy—joined by Justices Black, Reed, and Rutledge (who joined the Court after *Chenery I*)—authored the opinion of the Court. Because two Justices were recused, these four could issue a binding opinion. The majority concluded that *Chenery I* did not preclude the SEC’s action on remand and, moreover, that the SEC’s action was lawful. In so doing, it rejected the argument that “the Commission would be free only to promulgate a general rule outlawing such profits in future utility reorganizations; but such a rule would have to be prospective in nature and have no retroactive effect upon the instant situation.”¹⁰⁸ Though acknowledging that *Chenery I* “explicitly recognized the possibility that the Commission might have promulgated a general rule dealing with this problem under its statutory rule-making powers,” the *Chenery II* Court explained that the *Chenery I* Court “did not mean to imply thereby that the failure of the Commission to anticipate this problem and to promulgate a general rule withdrew all power from that agency to perform its statutory duty in this case.”¹⁰⁹ Allowing the agency to only “formulat[e] ...

¹⁰⁴ *See id.* at 100.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* at 95.

¹⁰⁶ S.E.C. v. *Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 199 (1947).

¹⁰⁷ *Id.*

¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 200.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.* at 201.

general rules ... for use in future cases of this nature ... would ... stultify the administrative process. That we refuse to do.”¹¹⁰ Indeed, the majority stressed that “[t]he absence of a general rule or regulation governing management trading during reorganization did not affect the Commission’s duties in relation to the particular proposal before it.”¹¹¹

Although encouraging the SEC “to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers,”¹¹² the Court rejected that rulemaking was the *only* way to make policy.¹¹³ Instead, agencies need flexibility. “In performing its important functions in these respects ... an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.”¹¹⁴ Accordingly, there is “a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”¹¹⁵ The Court noted this may result in retroactivity concerns but gave such concerns little weight, explaining that new interpretations are always, in a sense, retroactive.¹¹⁶ Thus, although agreeing that retroactivity *can* be unfair,¹¹⁷ the Court stressed that such retroactivity would not necessarily be fatal.¹¹⁸

Justice Jackson dissented, vehemently, in an opinion joined by Justice Frankfurter (the author of *Chenery I*).¹¹⁹ Indeed, Jackson opened his dissent by lamenting the change in the Court’s personnel,¹²⁰ after which he attacked

¹¹⁰ *Id.* at 202.

¹¹¹ *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ *Id.* (“[A]ny rigid requirement ... would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise”).

¹¹⁴ *Id.*

¹¹⁵ *Id.* at 203.

¹¹⁶ *See S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect, whether the new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative agency.”).

¹¹⁷ *See id.* (“Such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law.”).

¹¹⁸ *See id.*

¹¹⁹ Justice Burton—who also joined the Court post-*Chenery I*—concurred in the result without an opinion.

¹²⁰ *Chenery*, 332 U.S. at 210 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There being no change in the order, no additional evidence in the record and no amendment of relevant legislation, it is clear that there has been a shift in attitude between that of the controlling membership of the Court when the case was first here and that of those who have the power of decision on this

the Court for its “lawlessness.”¹²¹ As he saw it, although “[b]oth the Commission and the Court admit that these purchases were not forbidden by any law, judicial precedent, regulation or rule,” the SEC nonetheless “ordered these individuals to surrender their shares to the corporation at cost, plus 4% interest, and the Court now approves that order.”¹²² In his view, upholding such an order “makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality” since the Commission’s order “literally takes valuable property away from its lawful owners for the benefit of other private parties without full compensation and the Court expressly approves the taking.”¹²³

Nor was Jackson persuaded that he should defer to the SEC’s expertise. Even if he agreed that the agency was the expert, he did not think it followed that the new policy had to be enforced *retroactively*. Indeed, as Jackson saw it, “to uphold the Commission by professing to find that it has enunciated a ‘new standard of conduct’ brings the Court squarely against the invalidity of retroactive law-making.”¹²⁴ Jackson concluded by warning that *Chenery II* “is an ominous [case] to those who believe that men should be governed by laws that they may ascertain and abide by, and which will guide the action of those in authority as well as of those who are subject to authority.”¹²⁵

E. The Modern *Chenery II* Doctrine.

Chenery II is now a settled principle of law.¹²⁶ As the Supreme Court explained in *NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.*, an agency “is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and . . . the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s discretion.”¹²⁷ Indeed, so long as an agency has power to engage in rulemaking and adjudication, “adjudication [can] operate[] as an appropriate mechanism not only for factfinding, but also for the exercise of delegated lawmaking powers, including lawmaking by interpretation.”¹²⁸ Nor is this

second review.”); *compare* Transcript of Opinion Announcement, *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much.”).

¹²¹ *Id.* (Jackson, J., dissenting).

¹²² *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 211 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) .

¹²³ *Id.* at 211.

¹²⁴ *Id.* at 213.

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 217.

¹²⁶ *See, e.g.*, Bijal Shah, *Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication*, 128 HARV. L. REV. 803, 825 (2015).

¹²⁷ 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).

¹²⁸ *Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n*, 499 U.S. 144, 154 (1991).

power merely theoretical, particularly within some agencies.¹²⁹ In fact, “[t]he National Labor Relations Board, uniquely among major federal administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually *all* the legal rules in its field through adjudication rather than rulemaking.”¹³⁰

Of course, *Chenery II* is not always relevant. Sometimes Congress “establish[es] a system in which the agency lacks power to act until it first promulgated a valid set of legislative rules.”¹³¹ In that sort of system, an agency cannot enforce the statute directly like the SEC was able to do in *Chenery II*. Nonetheless, despite these exceptions, the *Chenery II* scenario is quite common. Indeed, it is “typical” that an agency has power to either make policy through rulemaking or adjudication directly under the statute.¹³² As discussed below, for situations that do not fit this “typical” pattern, the Court could overrule *Seminole Rock* with more confidence because the agency in response could not simply begin to apply the statute directly.¹³³

Since *Chenery II* was decided, moreover, the Supreme Court has decided that interpretations announced in agency adjudications can receive *Chevron* deference. In *Mead*, for instance, the Court explained that a grant of “power to engage in adjudication” is itself evidence that *Chevron* applies.¹³⁴ Although some interpretations announced in informal adjudications do not receive *Chevron* deference, especially if the scheme seems far removed from a run-of-the-mill regulatory framework, those interpretations announced in formal adjudications effectively always do.¹³⁵

Similarly, courts have continued to recognize that policy announced in agency adjudication can be enforced retroactively. In particular, lower courts generally apply the following factors from the en banc D.C. Circuit to evaluate retroactivity:

- (1) Whether the particular case is one of first impression,
- (2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well-established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law,
- (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule,
- (4) the degree of burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and
- (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old

¹²⁹ See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, *Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies)*, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 808-08 (2013) (explaining that “the authority to proceed through adjudication is common”).

¹³⁰ *Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB*, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998).

¹³¹ *Stephenson & Pogoriler*, *supra* note __, at 1481

¹³² *Manning II*, *supra* note __, at 895.

¹³³ See *infra* __.

¹³⁴ See *United States v. Mead Corp.*, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).

¹³⁵ See *id.* at 230.

standard.¹³⁶

These open-ended factors, however, do not impose a rigid test.¹³⁷ And at least in some courts, it appears judges are more willing to find retroactivity impermissible when an agency is interpreting a rule than a statute.¹³⁸

The D.C. Circuit, moreover, has held there is a “presumption of retroactivity for adjudications,” meaning that an agency’s *failure* to apply a policy retroactively can itself be arbitrary and capricious.¹³⁹ And the D.C. Circuit has stressed that “a mere lack of clarity in the law does not make it manifestly unjust to apply a subsequent clarification of that law to past conduct.”¹⁴⁰ To be sure, not all retroactivity is permissible—“[t]hough agencies are entitled to deference, they may not retroactively *change* the rules at will.”¹⁴¹ This is especially true when the agency’s view departs in an extreme way from what an ordinary person would expect based on past conduct¹⁴²—for instance because the policy reflects an unexpected change from what was understood to be the law—or when fines are at issue.¹⁴³ But if the agency has not *changed* its policy in an extreme way, it is difficult to successfully raise a retroactivity argument.¹⁴⁴ In other words, if the status quo under the statute is simply unclear (as it often is in novel fact patterns), an agency has a freer hand to declare the law and then apply that declaration retroactively.¹⁴⁵

II. *SEMINOLE ROCK* AND *CHENERY II* ARE IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTES

Despite the attention that has been paid to *Seminole Rock* in recent years, few have reflected on *Chenery II*,¹⁴⁶ at least not during this generation.¹⁴⁷

¹³⁶ *Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder*, 760 F.3d 571, 581 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Clark-Cowlitz Joint Op. Agency v. FERC*, 826 F.2d 1074, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)).

¹³⁷ *See id.* (“Like most such unweighted multi-factor lists, this one serves best as a heuristic; no one consideration trumps the others.”).

¹³⁸ *See Stephenson & Pogoriler*, *supra* note __, at 1479 (collecting citations).

¹³⁹ *Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC*, 509 F.3d 531, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*

¹⁴¹ *NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC*, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

¹⁴² *See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA*, 53 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

¹⁴³ *See, e.g., Kieran Ringgenberg, The Conflict Between Fair Warning and Adjudicative Retroactivity in D.C. Circuit Administrative Law*, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 914, 916 (1999).

¹⁴⁴ *See, e.g., Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC*, 509 F.3d 531, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

¹⁴⁵ *Id.* at 539.

¹⁴⁶ To be sure, some have expressed concern about *Chenery II*. *See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State*, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 535 (2003) (“*Chenery II* is troubling. It is inconsistent with subsequent cases ... that demand more transparency and rationality for discretionary agency decisions. Moreover, in the context of modern agency decisionmaking procedures, it provides

This is curious. A moment's reflection confirms that the two doctrines are related and, in fact, can be used to achieve similar ends. This is especially true for an agency that values regulatory flexibility. Although such agencies are not *indifferent* between proceeding by rulemaking or adjudication, either doctrine *can* do the trick. This section illustrates how *Chenery II* and *Seminole Rock* are substitutes, and then explains why the fact that these doctrines are only imperfect substitutes does not mean that there is no substitution between them. As explained in Part III, the fact that there is substitution matters because it suggests that if the Court were to overrule *Seminole Rock*, thereby making rulemaking relatively less attractive, the result would be greater use of *Chenery II* and case-by-case adjudication.

A. *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II* Can Be Substitute Doctrines.

At the outset, it is essential to understand that *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II* are substitutes, i.e., they “at least partly satisfy the same needs” of agencies and “therefore can be used to replace one another.”¹⁴⁸ This point is not well understood in the literature. Indeed, although Manning observed “[b]ecause *Chenery* establishes the right to forgo rulemaking altogether, the agency’s ability to flesh out an imprecise or vague rule through adjudication arguably only gives the agency discretion that it already has,”¹⁴⁹ few others have made that connection, nor has Manning pursued it. Nevertheless, because they are substitutes, albeit imperfect ones, either *Seminole Rock* or *Chenery II* can be used to achieve future flexibility for the agency.

To see why, consider three scenarios. The first is simplest and is intended to illustrate basic substitution between *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II*. The next two are more complicated. The second scenario, for instance, is one in which the statute itself contains prohibitions, albeit with ambiguous terms

far more opportunities for abuse than it did in 1947.”). Yet few have adopted this position. *See id.* (“*Chenery II*, though decided during the reign of the expertise model, has enjoyed enduring support. ... When push comes to shove, few scholars want to reduce agency flexibility.”).

¹⁴⁷ *See, e.g.,* Manning II, *supra* note __, at 901-13 (explaining past criticism).

¹⁴⁸ GRAHAM BANNOCK, R. E. BAXTER, & EVEN DAVIS, *THE ECONOMIST DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS* 77 (Penguin 1972); *see also* STIGLITZ, *supra* note __ at 407.

¹⁴⁹ *See* Manning, *supra* note __, at 665; *see also* Jonathan T. Molot, *The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role*, 53 *STAN. L. REV.* 1, 102 (2000) (“If *Seminole Rock*’s only effect were to postpone some lawmaking from rulemaking to adjudication, it might not be so objectionable. Under a line of cases wholly distinct from *Seminole Rock*—most notably, *SEC v. Chenery* and *NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.*—agencies already may choose between rulemaking and adjudication when deciding how best to exercise their delegated powers.”).

(the “*Chevron* Scenario”), while the third scenario is one in which the statute does not provide any meaningful direction, e.g., the agency can regulate in the “public interest” (the “Non-*Chevron* Scenario”). Of course, both the *Chevron* and Non-*Chevron* scenarios, in a sense, present *Chevron* questions because at an abstract level a court always must decide if the agency has stayed within the lines. For purpose of this analysis, however, it is useful to distinguish them for reasons that will become apparent.

1. The Simple Scenario

Let’s begin with a simple scenario. Imagine a general counsel who works for agency that Congress has entrusted with both rulemaking and adjudication authority, as in *Chenery II*. This general counsel must decide how best to use her agency’s authority. Imagine further that she places a high value on flexibility going forward. After all, she realizes it may be difficult to anticipate all the ways in which the agency may wish to exercise power in the future especially because the industry her agency regulates is a dynamic one.¹⁵⁰ She also knows her agency is often subject to litigation, so whatever it does, it has to be careful. What does this general counsel do?

According to the critics of *Seminole Rock*, an agency in this situation may elect to promulgate an ambiguous rule, knowing that in a future adjudication it could flesh out the meaning of the rule with retroactive effect. In other words, an ambiguous rule, on this telling, allows an agency to avoid pinning itself down. At the same time, even if ambiguous, the agency may reason that a rule has at least *some* ability to direct the activities of regulated parties, especially because a rule can cover a multitude of different issues, only some of which the agency concludes may benefit from future flexibility (i.e., only portions of a rule need to be ambiguous). Thus, this general counsel may think that an ambiguous rule is the way to go; it will provide some guidance but yet not tie the agency’s hands with regards to those questions upon which the agency is not yet ready to bind itself.¹⁵¹ And if some regulated party ever were cross the line the agency could then enforce the ambiguous rule with confidence because of *Seminole Rock*.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations.”).

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1459 (“[I]t might sometimes be desirable for agencies to build a bit of flexibility into their rules by writing them in somewhat open-ended terms and fleshing them out as the agency gains experience with implementing the regulatory program.”).

But then this general counsel realizes something else: rulemaking is not always easy to do.¹⁵² It takes time and effort to promulgate a rule. When it comes to rulemaking, after all, Congress pays attention—and sometimes newspapers do too. And if the rule has enough economic significance, the burdens are even heavier. So imagine this general counsel asks herself: “Isn’t there another way?” She then remembers *Chenery II*. In *Chenery II*, the SEC was able to announce an important policy without promulgating a rule at all. Could her agency do that too? Even better, why couldn’t the agency wait to initiate such an adjudication until it is ready to bind itself?¹⁵³ All the while, of course, the agency could issue guidance documents and make other informal communications (like speeches) regarding issues it is confident about, but say nothing about the issues upon which it wants to retain flexibility.

The story just spelled out is obviously imaginary, though it mirrors the imagery and rhetoric used by Justice Scalia and other *Seminole Rock* critics.¹⁵⁴ But might there be at least a shadow of truth to it? If an agency *really* wants to preserve flexibility, couldn’t it do it either by promulgating an ambiguous regulation or by not promulgating a regulation at all and instead just waiting for the right time, if necessary, to adjudicate the contested issue under the statute itself? No doubt, there are many circumstances in which agencies do not care about flexibility; indeed, how often they value flexibility, and how much, are empirical questions that have not been answered.¹⁵⁵ But is it unthinkable that there may be some instances in which flexibility is important enough to drive this sort of analysis?

For purposes of this section, assume that there are such circumstances.¹⁵⁶ As explained above, however, one can accept the thesis of this Article, without accepting the “strong” version of this story; agencies may not deliberately *create* ambiguity with the goal of obtaining deference, but yet may *tolerate* ambiguity because the costs of drafting a specific rule are

¹⁵² See Manning, *supra* note __, at 664 (explaining difficulty of rulemaking); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., *Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to “Testing the Ossification Hypothesis,”* 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (2012) (similar).

¹⁵³ See, e.g., *Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance*, 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004) (explaining that agencies often have flexibility not to act).

¹⁵⁴ See, e.g., *Decker v. N.W. Env. Def. Ctr.*, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“*Auer* is not a logical corollary to *Chevron* but a dangerous permission slip for the arrogation of power.”).

¹⁵⁵ See Part III, *infra* (explaining the importance of this empirical question).

¹⁵⁶ See, e.g., Aneil Kovvali, Note, *Seminole Rock and the Separation of Powers*, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB POL’Y, 849, 851 (2012) (“NLRB’s ‘congenital disinclination’ to promulgate rules is better seen as a form of self-aggrandizement.”); cf. Jennifer Nou, *Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review*, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013) (explaining how agencies will strategically try to avoid presidential review).

significant and it is not yet prepared to think through every issue. An agency's willingness to tolerate ambiguity surely is influenced by the consequences of that ambiguity, at least at the margins.¹⁵⁷

This simple example thus shows it is possible to use either *Seminole Rock* or *Chenery II* to obtain flexibility. Thus, for an agency that values such flexibility, these two doctrines are substitutes. To be sure, this general counsel may prefer rulemaking to adjudication, or vice versa, because each procedure has its own respective pros and cons that are not related to flexibility. For instance, the agency may want to learn from the regulated community, and so prefer notice-and-comment rulemaking. Or the agency may think rulemaking is too labor-intensive and so prefer adjudication. Such considerations will influence what path the agency takes. But at least in terms of flexibility, the agency can use either *Seminole Rock* or *Chenery II*.

2. The *Chevron* Scenario

Now continue with our story, but with more detail. Imagine that the statute at issue says that the “agency can regulate discharges of noxious pollutants from power plants.” The general counsel knows that some readings of the statute are unlawful because they exceed the power Congress has delegated. For instance, the agency could not regulate ordinary bottled water, because, even with *Chevron* deference, that is not a reasonable reading of “noxious pollutant.” Nor could the agency regulate pollution discharges, even if noxious, from a restaurant because restaurants are not “power plants.” She also knows that a court would conclude that there is an interpretation (or zone of interpretations) that are the “best,” i.e., what the court would choose if it were interpreting the statute *de novo* rather than with *Chevron* deference. Finally, as a savvy official, this general counsel also knows that despite the fact that there are some readings of the statute that are impermissible, there also is a great deal of ambiguity in this statute; what constitutes a “discharge” may not be entirely self-defining, nor what constitutes a “power plant” or “noxious pollutant.” Also imagine that the agency has a preferred policy now but it is not sure if it will continue to prefer that policy in the future.

¹⁵⁷ Of course, it is important to remember that an agency is a “they” and not an “it.” See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, *Allocating Power Within Agencies*, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036-38 (2011). One can speculate, for instance, that the political leadership, who are there only temporarily, may have a stronger preference for an inflexible rule because they will not have another shot to create policy. Cf. *id.* at 1038 (“[T]he basic points are simple: agencies contain identifiable constituencies that affect policymaking, and these constituencies can, and do, come into conflict over the proper functioning of the agency.”). For purpose of this Article, it is not essential to dwell on how agency preferences are formed.

Now this agency has to decide what to do. There is a menu of options. It could promulgate a clear rule, an ambiguous rule, a rule that is co-extensive with the statute, or not promulgate a rule at all. (As will become clear, there are other options too, which can be used in conjunction with each of these options; for instance, rather than act formally, the agency could use less formal devices like guidance documents.¹⁵⁸) Consider each option.

First, the agency might choose to promulgate a “clear” rule. Although absolute clarity is impossible, it is possible to promulgate a regulation stating the agency’s views in some detail. Substantively, for instance, the agency may prefer a policy within the total field of regulatory space that is not the “best reading” of the statute but that also is not an impermissible reading with *Chevron* deference. For purposes here, assume the agency’s ideal policy would be something “the only permissible discharges are less than 10 parts per million of Agent 243 from facilities that were designated as power plants under Department of Energy regulations as of January 1, 2014.” In this stylized example, assume that this is a clear regulation that would be understood by the regulatory community.

What is the result of picking this option? In the future, the agency’s discretion will be limited. Promulgating a “clear” regulation constrains the scope of regulatory power. Regulated parties, after all, would know exactly what they have to do to avoid liability: stick within the clear confines set out by the agency. Indeed, because it is difficult for agencies to promulgate regulations (and to undo regulations already promulgated), once an agency has done so, regulated parties can have more confidence in the stability of the scheme and thus participate in the market with greater confidence.¹⁵⁹ But the flipside is also true; a clear rule makes it harder for an agency to change its policy in the future. After all, agencies must follow their own rules¹⁶⁰ and can only eliminate a rule through another round of rulemaking.¹⁶¹ Thus, if policy

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., Magill, *supra* note __, at 1396 (listing menu of options).

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Jonathan Masur, *Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments*, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1037-60 (2007) (explaining agency commitment mechanisms); Elizabeth Magill, *Agency Self-Regulation*, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 903 (2009) (similar).

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., *Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Co.*, 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932); *Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FERC*, 777 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The Commission’s own regulations guaranteed to Panhandle recovery of six months of prudently incurred carrying charges. The Commission’s present interpretation of the order would deny Panhandle recovery of these charges in violation of the familiar rule that an agency must follow its own regulations.”) (citations omitted).

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, OFF. FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (“If an agency decides to amend or revoke a rule, it must use the notice-and-comment process to make the change.”).

preferences were to change, the agency would have to promulgate a new rule before it could punish anyone. To be sure, there are other benefits of rulemaking: clear rules make it “less expensive for an agency to prove noncompliance” and “may also help an agency exert centralized control over field offices,” to say nothing of “binding subsequent administrations.”¹⁶² But if future flexibility is important, a clear rule is a bad strategy.

So consider the next option: the agency could promulgate an “ambiguous” rule (realizing, of course, that the line between clear and ambiguous is a question of degree more than kind). Today, the agency still prefers the same policy of “less than 10 parts per million” policy. But the agency wants flexibility for tomorrow. Thus, the agency could promulgate a rule that says something like this: “We will not allow excessive rates—as compared against industry standards—of discharge of Agent 243 or like pollutants from any commercial facility that, directly or indirectly, generates power.” The agency could then issue a guidance document calming any fears about what this means in practice, thus encouraging investors to participate in the market—or those who are already in the market to stay in the market over the long run—so long as their emissions (say, 5 parts per million) are within the agency’s preference. And if any regulated party were to violate the agency’s “less than 10 parts per million” preference, the agency could bring an enforcement action with confidence that it would receive *Seminole Rock* deference if the issue were challenged before a court.

Again, what is the result? The agency’s preferred policy is the same, but it has much more discretion going forward. To be sure, there are downsides to an ambiguous rule. If the agency wants a 10 ppm standard, for instance, there is a risk that its assurances in guidance documents and the like will not be enough to persuade companies to invest or, if applicable, to stay in the market.¹⁶³ This is a real cost from the agency’s perspective that this general counsel would consider in her internal cost/benefit analysis of what procedure to recommend. But if flexibility is of high value, this is a good strategy.

This general counsel might think, however, that if an ambiguous rule creates flexibility, it would create even more flexibility to promulgate a rule that is coterminous with the statute, i.e., a rule that “parrots” the statute or,

¹⁶² Manning, *supra* note __, at 655-56.

¹⁶³ See, e.g., Masur, *supra* note __, at 1024 (“[A]n agency will have difficulty convincing regulated parties to invest resources or take other actions that may well be critical to the success of a regulatory initiative when it cannot assure the private actor that the agency rule—upon which these investments depend—will remain in place for an appreciable amount of time.”).

similarly, is simply “mush.”¹⁶⁴ That sort of rule would maximize flexibility since every policy available under the statute would also be available under the regulation, without having to go through a new round of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Moreover, a rule that “parrots” the statutory language would, by definition, allow the agency to achieve its preferred policy right now, again, with guidance documents and other informal devices serving as a tool to assuage concerns about those who may worry about the breadth of the rule. Thus, this sort of rule may provide the most flexibility.

This option now, however, has no upside. Ten years ago, the Supreme Court held that *Seminole Rock* deference does not apply if a rule just parrots statutory language.¹⁶⁵ To be sure, because there is wiggle room about what counts as “parroting” or “mush,” some judge might conclude that the rule’s language is different enough from the statute’s to obtain deference.¹⁶⁶ But there is a significant risk that a court would deny *Seminole Rock* deference, especially if, per this stylized example, the rule’s language is exactly the same as the statute’s or is utterly “mush.” Accordingly, adopting this sort of parroting regulation would not provide additional flexibility.

Finally, what if the agency does not promulgate a regulation at all? This is the *Chenery II* situation. Although there would be downsides (e.g., all the downsides associated with promulgating an ambiguous rule, only more potent, plus potentially the costs of multiple adjudications, etc.¹⁶⁷), this option would allow the agency all of the flexibility as the parroting option, but, unlike the parroting option, this strategy would not require a rule. Because agencies can receive *Chevron* deference for interpretations announced in adjudications, the agency would have the entire space of lawful interpretations to play with should it ever change its mind about its preferred

¹⁶⁴ To be sure, the line between “mush” and “non-mush,” “parroting” and “non-parroting” is a hard one to draw. See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1471 (“All regulations are at least somewhat open ended. What, then, counts as ‘mush’? Many regulations that interpret statutes do not use identical language, but do use similar language or alternate phrasings. When, then, is the agency guilty of ‘parroting’?”).

¹⁶⁵ See *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). For thoughtful discussions of the anti-parroting doctrine see Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1467-71; Hanah Metchis Volokh, *The Anti-Parroting Canon*, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 290 (2011).

¹⁶⁶ See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1471 (explaining that “some opinions appear to suggest that the prohibition on agencies’ promulgating mush means that, so long as the agency rule is not so vague as to be meaningless, applying *Seminole Rock* deference is unproblematic”).

¹⁶⁷ Some of the reasons why an agency may prefer rulemaking are set out in Part II.B.

policy. By definition, the policy space available to an agency even with *Seminole Rock* deference cannot exceed the policy space available under *Chevron*, for any regulation that falls outside of the statute is *ultra vires*.¹⁶⁸ Again, the agency may have to inform regulated parties through guidance documents and the like about its enforcement priorities, and, as before, some parties may not trust the agency's assurances. But in terms of maximizing flexibility, this is also a very attractive option.

3. The Non-*Chevron* Scenario

Now consider another, related scenario. Imagine that everything is the same as in the *Chevron* Scenario (same general counsel, same agency, same policy preference today, and same desire for flexibility tomorrow), but with one important variation: the statute says something different. Rather than itself prohibiting any conduct, albeit in ambiguous ways, imagine now that the statute says something like “within its jurisdiction, the agency should ensure that those it regulates act in the public interest.”¹⁶⁹ In a sense, this also is a *Chevron* question because, in theory, a court could conclude that the agency's conduct is not directed towards a “public” end or that some policy is not within the agency's “jurisdiction.” But for purposes of our analysis, assume there is not a “best” reading of this statutory language in any meaningful sense. Instead, any dispute boils down to a policy question, not an interpretation question.¹⁷⁰ (Why it is necessary to distinguish this scenario from the *Chevron* Scenario will become apparent in Part IV. As a preview, replacing *Chevron* deference with *Skidmore* deference would have little effect in terms of mitigating substitution away from rulemaking if *Seminole Rock* were overruled for a “pure policy” statute like this.)

Our imaginary general counsel again must decide what to do. She has the same options as before; her agency can issue a “clear” rule, an “ambiguous” rule, or no rule. The “parroting” option is also unhelpful in this scenario and so that analysis need not be repeated.

¹⁶⁸ Suffice it to say, a regulation that purports to regulate more than the statute it implements is void. *See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital*, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”). *Cf. Gonzales*, 546 U.S. at 256 (“In *Auer*, the underlying regulations gave specificity to a statutory scheme the Secretary of Labor was charged with enforcing . . .”) (emphasis added).

¹⁶⁹ *Cf. Chenery*, 332 U.S. at 204 (authoring the agency to regulate in “fair and equitable” ways consistent with “the public interest”) (citations omitted).

¹⁷⁰ *See Manning, supra* note __, at 622 (noting statutes that “make[] no pretense of specifying precisely the level of permissible hazardous emissions”).

First, what happens if the agency issues a clear rule? Once again, the agency would have limited flexibility. Regulated parties would know how to avoid liability and the agency could not easily change its policy in the future. The only difference between this option and the first option from the *Chevron* Scenario is that the concept of a “best” reading is not relevant here. But in terms of flexibility, there is no real change. Accordingly, as in the *Chevron* Scenario, if flexibility is especially valuable, this is a bad strategy.

Next, what happens if the agency issues an ambiguous rule? As in the *Chevron* Scenario, it again has increased flexibility. To be sure, this flexibility comes at a cost for all the reasons explained before; for instance, it certainly is harder for an agency to credibly commit to a policy if it does not have a clear rule in place, plus a rule would help it better direct its own employees. Again, guidance documents may help mitigate some of these concerns, but they do not provide the same stability as an actual clear regulation. But if flexibility is valued highly, this is a good option.

Finally, what happens if the agency does not promulgate a rule at all? Every policy available to it under a clear or ambiguous rule is also available here. As before, this flexibility also comes at a cost. Indeed, not promulgating a rule in this scenario might result in even less stability than in the *Chevron* Scenario because the scope of what the agency can regulate under the statute standing alone is so much wider. This means that those potentially subject to this statute may try to escape, for instance by not investing in a regulated market or, having already invested, deciding to leave the market. But once again, if flexibility is the goal, this approach also has a lot of upside.

* * *

As should be apparent from these examples, an agency that puts a high value on future flexibility can do many of the same things with *Chenery II* as it can with *Seminole Rock*. No doubt, there are trade-offs. Without a rule, for instance, it is harder for the agency to communicate its policy and the agency’s commitment to that policy is less credible, which may influence who participates in the market. These trade-offs are conceded. But if flexibility is a priority, both *Chenery II* and *Seminole Rock* can do the trick. Again, it is not necessary to accept the “strong” version of the anti-*Seminole Rock* criticism for this to be true. Instead, it is enough that if the consequences of ambiguity are less costly, it stands to reason that an agency would be more willing to accept ambiguity. To be clear, moreover, the real world is more complex than these stylized examples. Even so, these examples illustrate conceptually how agency flexibility can be obtained either through *Seminole Rock* or *Chenery II*.

B. Imperfect Substitutes are Still Substitutes.

The substitutability between *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II*, of course, has not been entirely overlooked. Most notably, Manning has acknowledged that because “an agency can typically implement its delegated authority through adjudication rather than rulemaking, then perhaps it makes little sense to worry about the fact that an imprecise or ambiguous regulation reserves discretion to an agency to make policy through adjudication.”¹⁷¹ After acknowledging this point, however, Manning moved on by explaining that “[a]gencies are not institutionally indifferent to the choice between rulemaking and adjudication.”¹⁷²

This sort of “indifference” observation is correct—as far as it goes. As the three scenarios set out above examples illustrate, there are important differences between rulemaking and adjudication and agencies no doubt have their preferences.¹⁷³ But such arguments do not account for the fact that even if an agency is not “indifferent” regarding which procedure it uses, it does not follow that in some circumstances its preference for one cannot be overcome because of its greater preference for other benefits like flexibility.

Put another way, even though *Chenery II* and *Seminole Rock* are not *perfect* substitutes, they still can still be *imperfect* substitutes. This economic concept explains why coal and natural gas can be in the same market, even though they are very different products and the switching costs between them can be expensive.¹⁷⁴ Differences alone, in other words, do not *per se* defeat substitution so long as the two options can meet similar needs. In economics jargon, the question is one of “cross-elasticity of demand.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Manning, *supra* note __, at 665.

¹⁷² *Id.*

¹⁷³ See, e.g., Magill, *supra* note __, at 1396 (“An agency’s selection of a policymaking tool thus matters for self-evident reasons. Each form should be thought of as a package with specific features—the procedure the agency must follow; whether and how the agency’s action binds private parties; whether and when the agency’s action can be challenged in court; and the standard that a court will apply when that suit is brought. The choice among them is likely to have an effect on policy formulation and, in any event, is a consequential choice from the perspective of parties who follow the agency’s activities.”).

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A. v. Baptist Health*, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (E.D. Ark. 2008) (explaining this antitrust concept using fuel as an example).

¹⁷⁵ See, e.g., BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAN, *supra* note __, at 47-48 (explaining cross-elasticity); James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz. “Tally-Ho!”: *UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines*, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 587, 604 (2011) (“If the two goods are substitutes, then the cross-elasticity of demand will be positive—in other words, as the price of one product rises, the demand for the other also will rise (all else remaining constant). In the case of perfect substitutes (for instance, commodity products), cross-elasticity is equal to positive infinity. For imperfect substitutes (like differentiated products), cross-elasticity will

Applying this economic insight, although flexibility must be important before an agency would trade rulemaking (without *Seminole Rock*) for adjudication (with *Chenery II*), that does not mean that an agency would *never* make that trade. Even imperfect substitutes exert a gravitational pull—i.e., substitution effects—when the first preference is no longer available.¹⁷⁶ Accordingly, although the benefits of rulemaking are real (as discussed below), particularly for certain types of situations, those benefits can be outweighed by other considerations. Moreover, as explained below, many reasons why agencies may be reluctant to substitute between rulemaking and adjudication can be overstated.

1. The “Specific Versus General” Objection.

Scholars have explored why agencies choose rulemaking over adjudication. One reason is that a rule may be broader in scope than an adjudicative order.¹⁷⁷ Manning notes, for example, that although “*Chenery* does give agencies a presumptive legal right to implement their delegations through adjudication, practical or legal concerns may induce them to use rulemaking in particular contexts.”¹⁷⁸ In particular, “[r]ulemaking gives agencies opportunities for generic resolution of issues that might otherwise have to be developed through costly and repetitive case-by-case adjudication,” and though “an agency can announce a broad legal principle through adjudication, it must be prepared in every subsequent case to consider whether that principle should be distinguished or overturned.”¹⁷⁹

This observation is true. It is easier for an agency to regulate broadly with a rule than an order. Even so, the sorts of policies that emerge from rulemaking and adjudication are not different in kind.¹⁸⁰ Even Manning

remain positive but may fall within a range of values that reflect the relative ‘closeness’ of competition between the products.”).

¹⁷⁶ Indeed, Manning himself seems to acknowledge that substitution would occur. See Manning, *supra* note __, at 693-94.

¹⁷⁷ See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, *The Rulemaking Continuum*, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1482 (1992) (“Case-by-case adjudication is inefficient ...; it threatens not only expense but also undesirable variation in individual cases—and particularly so in the staff negotiations that will inevitably set the table for any formal proceeding.”); Arthur Earl Bonfield, *State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology*, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 127 (1990) (“Lawmaking by adjudication is likely to require litigation before the agency in a multiplicity of cases, whereas a single rulemaking may settle the policy questions involved in many cases without need for future litigation before the agency to resolve them.”).

¹⁷⁸ Manning, *supra* note __, at 667.

¹⁷⁹ *Id.*

¹⁸⁰ See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1494 (“Notwithstanding that such

concedes that “an agency *can* announce a broad legal principle through adjudication,” if it is willing to bear the cost of doing so. At the same time, “[t]he same policies an agency can formulate by formal or informal rule are also generally susceptible of adjudication.”¹⁸¹ As Glen Robinson has explained, “though it may be true that, in general, rulemaking is likely to be more efficient and uniform than adjudication, the generality is not as widely applicable as it sometimes is asserted to be.”¹⁸²

In terms of preserving flexibility, from an agency’s perspective, if the benefits of ambiguous rules are reduced, then the cost of adjudication might be justified. All else being equal, an agency might prefer to issue a rule that, while still open-ended, is nonetheless more specific than the open-ended statute (thus obtaining some of the benefits of rulemaking). But a preference is just that—a preference. Preferences are subject to cost-benefit analysis. If the perceived benefits to the agency of flexibility are weighty, and if *Seminole Rock* deference were no longer an option, then one could imagine adjudication, on net, becoming more attractive.

Likewise, one must not overstate the fact that if an agency announces a broad rule in adjudication, it “must be prepared in every subsequent case to consider whether that principle should be distinguished or overturned.”¹⁸³ This is true as a doctrinal matter. But it is also true that many regulated parties are wary of pushing the line, especially if they think the agency will not back away from its decision. Regulated parties, like everyone else, make decisions in the shadow of the law, with the “law” here being Holmesian in character, i.e., one of “predication.”¹⁸⁴ If parties “predict” that the agency will not “distinguish” or “overturn” the policy, many regulated parties will continue to obey it. As Stephenson and Pogoriler explain in an analogous context, “[i]f an agency consistently adheres to its [position] when imposing requirements, evaluating permit applications, levying sanctions, and the like, then the formal status of the rule may not matter much.”¹⁸⁵

orders are ostensibly focused on the individual parties to the dispute, the agency order may state a broad interpretative principle that would clearly affect many other cases and that would serve as administrative precedent and authoritative announcement of the agency’s position.”).

¹⁸¹ Forsyth Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Sebelius, 652 F.3d 42 (2011) (Brown, J., dissenting).

¹⁸² Robinson, *supra* note __, at 517.

¹⁸³ Manning, *supra* note __, at 667.

¹⁸⁴ Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., *The Path of the Law*, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) (“Our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force.”); *see also id.* at 459 (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).

¹⁸⁵ *See, e.g.,* Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1462-63.

Moreover, this sort of “one fell swoop” argument, while not wrong, does not account for the fact that agencies have other means to announce how “generic” issues should be resolved that are neither rulemaking nor adjudication.¹⁸⁶ For instance, agencies can issue guidance documents for certain issues; they also can just pick up the phone and call, especially in industries with few players.

To be sure, these other means of communicating agency positions have costs of their own.¹⁸⁷ Most important, informal instruments cannot bind the agency—the agency, as a formal matter, must consider the issue anew.¹⁸⁸ Yet if an agency announces a policy through an informal means, often there will never be a need for adjudication at all.¹⁸⁹ Many regulated parties do not lightly cross the agencies that regulate them—hence the use and utility of what Tim Wu has dubbed “agency threats.”¹⁹⁰ If a party believes, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that its regulator is going to interpret the law one way, for instance, according to what the agency has already said in an informal way, it often will not push the envelope even if, as a formal matter, it could.¹⁹¹

2. The “Information Deficit” Objection.

Rulemaking, unlike adjudication, also as a general matter “facilitates agency efforts to accumulate the information and policy analysis necessary to

¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., Magill, *supra* note ___, at 1386 (explaining menu of options).

¹⁸⁷ See *id.* at 1396-97.

¹⁸⁸ See, e.g., *Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n*, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (explaining that “[i]nterpretive rules ‘do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process.’”) (citation omitted); *Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Huerta*, 785 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying this principle to guidance documents and all other informal devices).

¹⁸⁹ See, e.g., William Funk, *A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules*, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1340 (2001) (“Agencies act with the knowledge that their nonlegislative rules may escape pre-enforcement review, and they may count on the coercive (extortionate) effect of the unreviewable rule to achieve compliance even when they might be very reluctant to test the validity of their rule in an actual enforcement action.”).

¹⁹⁰ See, e.g., Tim Wu, *Agency Threats*, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1842 (2011) (“Under conditions of uncertainty, absent the threat mechanism, the agency would have two options: to make law—through a rulemaking or adjudication—or to ignore the area altogether. Neither is particularly satisfying. The former forces the agencies to make law likely to last a long time based on poorly developed facts, and it invites long periods of uncertainty created by the judicial review process. The latter surrenders any public oversight or input during what may be a critical period of industry development.”).

¹⁹¹ See, e.g., *id.* at 1852-53.

formulate broad or complicated public policy.”¹⁹² Indeed, “[g]oing beyond the facts of the particular case requires investigation into additional factual and policy issues, and private litigants will rarely want to spend money on issues that are not of immediate interest.”¹⁹³ Thus, “when agencies proceed by adjudication, they must rely ‘more on the accident of litigation than on conscious planning.’ Conversely, rulemaking permits an agency to control the subject matter and scope of its own policymaking.”¹⁹⁴ All of this is true. But again, this truth should not be overstated.

Obviously, the notice-and-comment process can serve important important-acquiring functions.¹⁹⁵ Yet it is still possible for an agency to prioritize other things. This is especially so if the agency can obtain much of the information it wants other ways, such as by “targeted outreach” to the most relevant communities.¹⁹⁶ This can be done even without rulemaking; in fact, this sort of outreach occurs for guidance documents—sometimes in ways that raise concerns about the openness of the process.¹⁹⁷

Moreover, for certain types of policy decisions, the agency may not really care what is said in the comments anyway.¹⁹⁸ Indeed, in some rulemakings, agencies may use comments to “dress up” decisions already made.¹⁹⁹ In fact, responding to comments can be a bother; a common lament about rulemaking

¹⁹² Manning, *supra* note ___, at 667.

¹⁹³ *Id.*; *see also id.* (“Indeed, a litigant seeking prompt results has a keen interest in minimizing the scope of investigation.”)

¹⁹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁹⁵ *See, e.g.*, 1 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 2:12 (3d ed.) (“[T]he rulemaking procedures assure broad participation and create record support for generalized pronouncements.”).

¹⁹⁶ *See, e.g.*, Reeve T. Bull, *Market Corrective Rulemaking*, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 666 (2015) (noting possibility of “targeted outreach” and observing that “agencies may wish to explore a range of early public participation mechanisms” such as “gaug[ing] the reaction of various interest groups to a proposed regulatory action, in which case the agency might merely informally reach out to key players who might not otherwise take the initiative to submit public comments”); *see also* E. Donald Elliott, *Re-Inventing Rulemaking*, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (“No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties.”).

¹⁹⁷ *See, e.g.*, Nina A. Mendelson, *Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking*, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 427-29 (2007).

¹⁹⁸ *See, e.g.*, Mark Seidenfeld, *Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking*, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 514–15 (2002) (“[T]he thrust of some rules, if not the details, are preordained. This is especially true when an agency institutes a rulemaking proceeding to satisfy demands for a particular outcome from the White House or political appointees at the top of the agency.”).

¹⁹⁹ JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, *LEGISLATION AND REGULATION* 776 (2010); *see also* Aaron L. Nielson, *In Defense of Formal Rulemaking*, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237 (2014) (discussing some of the problems with informal rulemaking).

is agencies must respond to comments and do those other acts necessary to satisfy “hard look” review.²⁰⁰ Adjudication perhaps can be quicker.

Finally, this information-gathering argument may be too categorical. In industries with few players, everyone is aware of what is happening in an important adjudication, even if they are not parties to it.²⁰¹ Because everyone knows the stakes, companies pipe up, even if the adjudication does not formally involve them. After all, the agency’s legal precedent will impact their business, because the agency will apply it again. This is why the D.C. Circuit has squarely held that a party can seek pre-enforcement judicial review of an agency’s imminent application of an *adjudicatory* precedent involving *different* parties.²⁰² Reflecting this reality, agencies can and do sometimes solicit comments in adjudications, not just in rulemakings.²⁰³

3. The “Congressional Preferences” Objection.

Because Congress values rulemaking, sometimes it arguably pressures agencies to do it. That this congressional preference exists also suggests that agencies will not shift to adjudication if *Seminole Rock* were overruled.²⁰⁴

No doubt, sometimes Congress wants agencies to engage in rulemaking. Congress, for instance, may *require* agencies to do so, for instance by declaring that no legal obligation exists until after the agency has promulgated a rule.²⁰⁵ For example, the Environmental Protection Agency can only issue National Ambient Air Quality Standards by rulemaking.²⁰⁶ In such

²⁰⁰ See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, *A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review*, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 753, 764–65 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, *Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990*, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012) (noting that all ossification can be overstated, some rules do take a long time to promulgate).

²⁰¹ Cf. Robinson, *supra* note __, at 517.

²⁰² See, e.g., *Conference Group, LLC v. FCC*, 720 F. 3d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining that there are circumstances where the court has “‘allowed a party to challenge in advance an agency policy adopted via adjudication when the prospect of impending harm was effectively certain’”) (quoting *Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sebelius*, 595 F.3d 1303, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).

²⁰³ See, e.g., *Teva*, 595 F.3d at 1306.

²⁰⁴ See Manning, *supra* note __, at 667 (noting “the demand for agency rulemaking may reflect external political or legal requirements” and that “even where Congress has not [formally required rulemaking], agencies have at times reacted to their informal political environments by moving toward broadly participatory agency lawmaking”).

²⁰⁵ See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1481 (explaining that Congress may “establish a system in which the agency lacks power to act until it first promulgated a valid set of legislative rules”).

²⁰⁶ See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(B) (the agency “shall by regulation promulgate such

circumstances, there is no reason to worry about *Chenery II* because substitution is impossible. The Supreme Court thus could overrule *Seminole Rock* in this context with more confidence that unintended consequences would not result. Indeed, the fact that Congress has withheld authority to regulate except through rulemaking arguably creates a structural inference that the agency should not be able to make policy through adjudication.²⁰⁷

Yet it is common for agencies to have discretion to choose whether to act by rulemaking or adjudication.²⁰⁸ In this typical situation (i.e., one like *Chenery II*), that fact that Congress may prefer rulemaking—albeit not enough to require it—is only one value that the agency must consider. If flexibility is particularly important to the agency, it is possible to imagine the benefits of adjudication under *Chenery II* “winning out,” *despite* Congress’ preference. Again, imperfect substitutes are still substitutes; the more imperfect the substitute, the less substitution that takes place, meaning that if Congress wants rulemaking, that congressional preference makes adjudication a more imperfect substitute. But at the margins, there is still substitution.

4. The “Adjudication is a Pain” Objection.

Finally, agencies may prefer rulemaking because rulemaking may be less difficult than adjudication—potentially for a host of idiosyncratic reasons. So far this Article has elided what exactly is meant by “adjudication.”²⁰⁹ Obviously, however, adjudication comes in many flavors, involving different types of industries and regulatory standards, and different agencies have different institutional practices and priorities.²¹⁰ Some agencies thus may prefer rulemaking because adjudication can be difficult—especially if, as sometimes is required, the adjudication must be formal and on the record.²¹¹

proposed national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards”).

²⁰⁷ See Kovvali, *supra* note __, at 871 (“Congress’s decision to enact a secondary statute should be understood as a congressional command to promulgate a specific rule. . . . Refusing *Seminole Rock* deference when the underlying statute is secondary helps to police the integrity of this *congressional command* by forcing the agency to put content through the rulemaking process, instead of relying on later informal interpretive processes.”) (emphasis in original).

²⁰⁸ See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, *supra* note __, at 824.

²⁰⁹ See, e.g., Manning II, *supra* note __, at 901-14 (discussing *Chenery II* and policy-making in adjudication without getting into the details of what adjudication entails).

²¹⁰ See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, *APA Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?*, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 65, 71, 74 (1996) (explaining the “balkanization” of agency adjudication procedures across agencies and arguing that “the initial trial level in federal agency adjudication is becoming almost as variegated as the agency appellate structures—which have always been ‘unregulated’ by the APA”).

²¹¹ 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2012).

Likewise, perhaps, if there is a large volume of disputes, a rule might make more sense. Or an agency may not have the infrastructure in place to readily start using adjudication; path dependency is real. Or perhaps the agency is irrationally biased in favor of rulemaking; alarm bells should sound when we start assuming perfect rationality. In short, there are countless possible reasons why some agencies may prefer to issue a rule.

This Article does not pretend to go into all of the preferences and practices of individual agencies.²¹² Nor does it need to. It is enough to observe that *of course* some agencies may think that adjudication is onerous and so, all else being equal, tend to prefer rulemaking. But all that means is that for those agencies, competing values must be weightier before they would be willing to substitute away from rulemaking. It does not mean that even if there are other weighty values, these agencies would never substitute. Indeed, by the same token, there surely are some agencies that are relatively indifferent between rulemaking and adjudication, and so need much less to push them from one to the other. And there are other agencies that prefer to act by adjudication, which of course has benefits of its own (e.g., no review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the agency can pick the target, there are fewer comments, etc.).²¹³ Sometimes agencies have a strong preference for one form of procedure another another. Yet that does not mean that there can be no substitution even when the benefits of substitution are substantial.²¹⁴

C. Real World Examples.

Thus far, this Article has largely been theoretical—it has demonstrated why we would expect substitution to occur between rulemaking and adjudication if the value of one increased relative to the other. To be sure,

²¹² For instance, an agency may believe that acting through adjudication is less legitimate than rulemaking, especially for policies of wide applicability. On the other hand, some argue that adjudicative procedures increase legitimacy. *See, e.g.*, Henry J. Friendly, “*Some Kind of Hearing*,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-80 (1975) (noting the argument).

²¹³ This Paper does not purport to be a comprehensive examination of rulemaking versus adjudication. As this discussion shows, no doubt there are many reasons why agencies choose the form of policymaking that they do. *See, e.g.*, Magill, *supra* note __, at 1398 (noting that it is hard to explain why agencies choose the forms of procedures that they do).

²¹⁴ Empirical analysis of these questions would be valuable. As it is now, little if any scholarship has been devoted to understanding empirically why agencies choose to make policy through certain mechanisms rather than others. Indeed, the analysis presumably should be agency-specific because agencies vary widely across multiple dimensions. An agency that places a high value on immediate and direct regulatory conduct, for instance, may value flexibility less than an agency that is less certain about how it wants to proceed.

there are pros and cons of each so substitution is not costless. But if the value of one increases enough compared to the other, substitution should occur. In the next section of the Article, I will show why this substitution point is relevant to *Seminole Rock*: for agencies that value flexibility, overruling *Seminole Rock* will make rulemaking relatively less attractive, thus encouraging adjudication with *Chenery II*. Before doing so, however, it is useful to offer a few real-world examples of agencies choosing to substitute between rulemaking and adjudication. That these examples exist suggest that agencies that place a high value on flexibility also would be willing to substitute away from rulemaking if *Seminole Rock* were overruled. This is especially true because there are also examples of agencies acting in ways to preserve their own flexibility. Put these two categories of real-world examples together and there is reason to think that agencies that value flexibility may be willing to substitute away from rulemaking.

The first example is a case called *Qwest Services Corp. v. FCC*.²¹⁵ There, the D.C. Circuit confronted a complicated telecommunications case involving two different types of prepaid calling cards. One type “uses internet protocol (‘IP’) technology to transport part or all of a telephone call” while the other “offers a menu-driven interface through which users can either make a call or access several types of information.”²¹⁶ The Federal Communications Commission (“the FCC”) ultimately determined that both types of cards are “subject to access charges” as “telecommunications services.”²¹⁷ How the agency reached that decision, however, is noteworthy. Initially, the FCC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and began to solicit comments because it determined that adjudication was a poor fit for the question.²¹⁸ Yet when the FCC issued its final decision, it not only issued a rule, but it also issued “a declaratory ruling” that “announced that IP-transport and menu-driven cards ‘are telecommunications services and that their providers are subject to regulation as telecommunications carriers,’ and thus subject to the obligation to pay access charges to local exchange carriers.”²¹⁹ The FCC further declared “that a declaratory ruling was, notwithstanding the proceedings’ launch as a rulemaking, ‘a form of adjudication’ and recognized

²¹⁵ 509 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

²¹⁶ *Id.* at 534.

²¹⁷ *Id.*

²¹⁸ *See id.* at 535 (explaining that the FCC “stated that ‘[r]ather than try to address each possible type of calling card offering through a declaratory ruling,’ the Commission was initiating a rulemaking ‘to consider the classification and jurisdiction of new forms of prepaid calling cards.’”) (quoting AT & T Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Enhanced Prepaid Calling Card Services, 20 FCC Rcd 4826, 4826 ¶ 2 (2005)).

²¹⁹ *Id.* (quoting In the Matter of Regulation of Prepaid Calling Card Services, 21 FCC Rcd, 7290, 7293 ¶ 10 (2006)).

that “[g]enerally, adjudicatory decisions are applied retroactively.”²²⁰ Thus, the agency determined that it would retroactively apply its decision to “IP-transport cards,” but that it would only apply its decision prospectively to “menu-driven cards.”²²¹ The D.C. Circuit held that this midstream shift from rulemaking to adjudication was proper but also that the FCC erred by not giving its adjudication retroactive effect for both types of cards.²²²

This case is a good illustration of substitution as the FCC was able to fairly seamlessly substitute rulemaking for adjudication. Indeed, it did so in the middle of the rulemaking. Moreover, it also seems likely that the FCC opted to substitute between the two policy-making mechanisms because, at least in part, it wanted to avail itself of one of the benefits of adjudication: retroactivity. Rules are generally prospective-only but adjudication can be retroactive.²²³ *Qwest Services Corp.* thus suggests that agencies may decide which policymaking tool to use based on the legal doctrines surrounding it.²²⁴

Another example of substitution comes from immigration law. Alberto Gonzales has recently explained how when it comes to making immigration policy, the United States can use the Attorney General’s “review authority”—a form of adjudication—rather than “through the more traditional avenue of rulemaking.”²²⁵ The Attorney General has authority to review immigration decisions, and in so doing can “pronounce new standards for the agency.”²²⁶ Indeed, this form of adjudication can provide “nearly identical benefits in the form of clear guidance on policy issues.”²²⁷ Accordingly, Gonzales and his co-author Patrick Glen argue that rather than using rulemaking, which can take a long time and require more bureaucratic effort, the government should more often use adjudication,²²⁸ and he lists specific examples of important policies that were created in precisely this manner.²²⁹ To be sure, this power is

²²⁰ *Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC*, 509 F.3d 531, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting 21 FCC Rcd, at 7304-05 ¶ 41).

²²¹ *Id.*

²²² *Id.* at 535-36, 541.

²²³ *See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.*, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).

²²⁴ Along the same lines, another case worth mentioning is *Comcast v. FCC*, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), which rejected the FCC’s efforts to create a “network neutrality” scheme—which obviously has nationwide importance—through adjudication.

²²⁵ *See* Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, *Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority*, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 897 (2016).

²²⁶ *Id.* at 847 (quoting Joseph Landau, *DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law*, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 640 n.89 (2012)).

²²⁷ *Id.* at 898.

²²⁸ *Id.*

²²⁹ *See, e.g., id.* at 861-62 (changing policy regarding female genital mutilation); *id.* at 876 (adjudication used to “institute[] a new framework for considering when offenses qualify

not used often (suggesting that the other benefits of rulemaking can be significant), but Gonzales and Glen argue that it has been used in many important contexts and that it can and should be used in more still.

This is another good illustration of substitution—in this context, “nearly identical” policies can be created by rulemaking or adjudication and as the cost of rulemaking increases (e.g., the time required to do so), the regulator may shift to adjudication, even though the forms of policymaking are different. Given that Gonzales served as Attorney General and exercised this very discretion, this example is notable evidence that substitution is real.

At the same time, there are examples of agencies placing a high value on future flexibility. Indeed, *Chenery II* presupposes that some agencies have this preference²³⁰ and flexibility is one of the driving forces behind the widespread use of guidance documents.²³¹ Agencies have also openly admitted that they value flexibility—which makes sense because there are many valid reasons to want to “wait and see” what happens. For instance, the FCC has invoked flexibility as a reason for not promulgating a rule to govern “a dynamic and constantly changing industry.”²³²

There is also evidence suggesting that agencies may value flexibility enough to take steps to obtain it. For instance, agencies sometimes promulgate “mush.”²³³ This practice may be explainable by a desire to preserve flexibility. For instance, the Tenth Circuit confronted regulatory language stating that program participants must comply with “any additional conditions” specified by the agency; the court concluded that this language was so open-ended that it may be unconstitutional since “the Secretary could insert *any* condition into a program participation agreement, and claim authorization for that action”²³⁴ Similarly, the First Circuit has recently observed—in denying deference under anti-parroting rule—that an agency’s regulations “make no effort to define ‘trades or businesses,’ and merely refer to Treasury

as ‘crimes involving moral turpitude’ for purposes of the immigration laws”).

²³⁰ See *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations.”).

²³¹ See, e.g., Mendelson, *supra* note __, at 408 (“[A]gencies have several reasons to prefer using guidance documents to following the APA notice-and-comment procedure. ... The agency also retains flexibility to change the guidance inexpensively and quickly.”).

²³² See *Miscellaneous Rules Relating to Common Carriers*, 46 Fed. Reg. 5984-01, 6001 (Jan. 21, 1981) (“As the Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly, the imprecision which necessarily accompanies any broad conferral of legislative authority serves an important purpose of permitting the Commission to deal with a dynamic and constantly changing industry through case-by-case evolution and delineation of agency authority.”).

²³³ See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1471.

²³⁴ *Mission Grp. Kan., Inc. v. Riley*, 146 F.3d 775, 781 & n.6 (10th Cir. 1998).

regulations, which, as mentioned, also do not define the phrase.”²³⁵ And in *Christopher*, the Department of Labor’s regulation merely “cross-reference[d] back to the language of Section 3(k) of the Act—the very language purportedly being defined.”²³⁶ As in other contexts, this regulatory ambiguity may reflect agency refusals to pin themselves down.²³⁷

In short, agencies sometimes place a high value on flexibility. This observation, combined with the fact that agencies substitute between rulemaking and adjudication, suggests that if rulemaking were to become less valuable for preserving flexibility, some agencies may sometimes shift to adjudication.

III. AGENCIES WILL SUBSTITUTE TO *CHENERY II* IF *SEMINOLE ROCK* WERE OVERRULED—THEREBY HARMING REGULATED PARTIES

Administrative law is a complex network of interconnected doctrines. When one part of that network is changed, it has consequences for other parts. This Article has demonstrated that rulemaking and adjudication are substitutes, albeit imperfect ones. This cross-substitutability suggests that if *Seminole Rock* were overruled, we should expect agencies that place a high value on future flexibility to fall back on *Chenery II* more often than they do now. If that were to happen often enough, overruling *Seminole Rock* would create a world that is worse for regulated parties than the status quo because adjudication under *Chenery II* generally provides less notice than even ambiguous rules. Moreover, if such agencies were to provide notice in a post-*Seminole Rock* world, they would more often do so through informal means like guidance documents, thus reducing regulatory participation.

A. Without *Seminole Rock*, Agencies that Value Flexibility Would Increasingly Shift to *Chenery II*.

The key contention of this Article is that if *Seminole Rock* were overruled, those agencies that place a high value on flexibility should be expected to fall back on their power under *Chenery II* more often than they do now—at least at the margins. For such agencies, one would expect that

²³⁵ Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 141 (1st Cir. 2013).

²³⁶ Christopher v. Smith Kline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 394 (9th Cir. 2011).

²³⁷ See, e.g., Thomas Chen, *Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference*, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1177-78 (2008) (“Patent claims are often intentionally drafted with vague and ambiguous language in order to preserve sufficient maneuverability for future litigation.”).

substitution would increase if *Seminole Rock* were overruled because ambiguous regulations (with *Seminole Rock* deference) and no regulations at all (via *Chenery II*) are substitutes. Accordingly, although agencies are not indifferent between adjudication and rulemaking, if agencies place a high enough value on flexibility, they may determine that the trade-offs necessary to obtain that flexibility through adjudication are justified. Basic principles of microeconomics teach that substitution from rulemaking to adjudication should increase if rulemaking with *Seminole Rock* is no longer available.

Even today, some agencies prefer adjudication to rulemaking, despite the fact that *Seminole Rock* is still on the books. Indeed, the NLRB *never* prefers rulemaking.²³⁸ Overruling *Seminole Rock* should have no effect on those decisions; after all, agencies have already concluded that the net benefits of rulemaking with *Seminole Rock* are less than the net benefits of adjudication under *Chenery II*. The fact that agencies sometimes make such decisions, however, is circumstantial evidence that the use of *Chenery II* would increase if *Seminole Rock* were overruled. This is so because these examples illustrate that agencies sometimes prefer the expediency and relative inexpensiveness of adjudication *despite* the fact that rulemaking carries with it all the valuable benefits set out above in Part II.B. The fact that agencies, even today, do not always promulgate rules suggests that they would be even less likely to do so if *Seminole Rock* were no longer on the table.

The economic reasoning behind this insight is not especially complicated. By definition, if one substitute becomes relatively less attractive, the other substitute becomes relatively more attractive—that is why they are substitutes.²³⁹ Thus, as the net benefits of rulemaking (i.e., the aggregate of all the pros and cons) decrease, an agency’s willingness to promulgate a rule should also decrease, even if, absent the change, the agency would have preferred to issue a rule. Overruling *Seminole Rock*, in turn, would make rulemaking less valuable because it would diminish one of the benefits of rulemaking—a benefit that presumably is especially important to those agencies that place a high value on flexibility. Thus, if *Seminole Rock* were overruled, agencies that place a high value on flexibility should be expected to substitute to adjudication more often than they do now.

There is, of course, an important empirical question lurking here: how often do agencies value flexibility enough to trade for it? If *Seminole Rock*

²³⁸ See, e.g., *Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB*, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998).

²³⁹ See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 7 (2010) (“Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product quality or service.”).

were overruled, we should expect agencies to sometimes substitute to *Chenery II*, while other times to substitute to rulemaking with clearer rules. It depends on how much they value flexibility versus how much they value the benefits of rulemaking. Put another way, using technical jargon, to gauge what would happen if *Seminole Rock* were overruled, we would need to know an agency's cross-elasticity of demand for rulemaking (with *Seminole Rock*) versus adjudication (via *Chenery II*), as well as what the cross-elasticity of demand for rulemaking would be if *Seminole Rock* were overruled. If we knew this cross-elasticity information, we could determine what is more likely to happen if *Seminole Rock* were overruled: substitution to *Chenery II* (the unintended consequence) or substitution to clearer rules (the intended consequence).

Unfortunately, this empirical question is almost impossible to answer, especially given that the fact that these cross-elasticities surely vary across agencies.²⁴⁰ Even though it is difficult to know the answer, however, focusing on cross-elasticities is *right* question. If the Court does not even have a rough sense of these cross-elasticities, it may inadvertently make a serious mistake. After all, for all the reasons explained in Part III.B, if agencies shift to adjudication more than they shift to clear rules, overruling *Seminole Rock* may be worse than doing nothing. Needless to say, uncertainty regarding these empirical questions should counsel in favor of *stare decisis*.²⁴¹

It is worth observing, moreover, that if the most aggressive anti-*Seminole Rock* criticisms are correct that agencies, in fact, do *intentionally* promulgate vague regulations,²⁴² then there is reason to fear that such strategic actors would seek out substitutes for *Seminole Rock*. Moreover, even if agencies today are not engaging in strategic behavior when they decide whether to act by rulemaking or adjudication, perhaps that will change in the future as

²⁴⁰ See, e.g., Magill, *supra* note __, at 1399 (“Some agencies are known to rely heavily on adjudication, others on rulemaking, and others on a rich mix of the two. The NLRB and the FTC are known for their heavy reliance on adjudication as a way of making policy. The FCC, by contrast, relies heavily on rules. And FERC relies on both adjudication and general rules.”).

²⁴¹ See, e.g., *Kimble v. Marvel Entm't LLC*, 135 S.Ct. 2401 (2015) (refusing to overrule a precedent on the force of *stare decisis* because, *inter alia*, the Court lacked “empirical evidence” establishing that post-patent royalties are sufficiently pro-competitive).

²⁴² See, e.g., *Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.*, 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, *to do what it pleases.*”); *Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala*, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that agencies promulgate “vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication”).

administrative law becomes even more weaponized.²⁴³ Thus, if the *Seminole Rock* critics are right about how agencies behave, that may be a reason to retain *Seminole Rock*, not overrule it.

To be sure, the Article's substitution analysis does not require agencies to deliberately create ambiguity. Even if agencies do not deliberately create ambiguity but rather merely tolerate it, overruling *Seminole Rock* still may lead them to engage in more adjudication because the costs of ambiguity would increase. Thus, it would still be necessary to evaluate cross-elasticities of demand. But if agencies, in fact, do act in such strategic ways, then *Seminole Rock* and *Chenery II* could be quite close substitutes indeed.

B. Overruling *Seminole Rock* May be Worse Than Doing Nothing.

And now we come to the rub. If agencies began to fall back more often than on *Chenery II* in a post-*Seminole Rock* world, that outcome could be worse than doing nothing. This is so because adjudication under *Chenery II* provides no more prospective notice to regulated parties of their legal obligations than ambiguous rules under *Seminole Rock* do, and, indeed, usually provides less notice. Thus, to the extent that *Seminole Rock*'s critics are concerned about agencies retroactively springing legal obligations on regulated parties, overruling *Seminole Rock* may not be the answer.²⁴⁴ Moreover, if agencies were to provide notice to regulated parties in a post-*Seminole Rock* world, logic suggests that they would be more likely to do so through informal means like guidance documents. From the perspective of regulated parties, either of these outcomes could be worse than retaining the status quo. Again, of course, agencies sometimes would issue clearer rules (the intended consequence) while sometimes they would not issue rules at all (the unintended consequence). Unless the Supreme Court is confident, however, that the former would predominate the latter, overruling *Seminole Rock* could be a serious mistake.

Once more, consider the three scenarios set out above involving an agency general counsel. In those scenarios, almost by definition, the *Chenery*

²⁴³ See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, *Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age*, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012) (arguing that administrative law is increasingly becoming battleground for policy disputes).

²⁴⁴ Of course, some may dislike *Seminole Rock* because it combines lawmaking and law-interpretation in the same hands, even if that combination does not produce negative consequences. Yet consequences play a key role in *stare decisis*, which ultimately is a pragmatic doctrine. See, e.g., Randy Kozel, *Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine*, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 414 (2010). Moreover, as explained below, the animating principle of the "same hands" maxim is preventing retroactivity. See *infra* ___.

II options provide less notice than the *Seminole Rock* options, or at least no more notice. This is unsurprising. If an agency promulgates a rule, the amount of “policy space” that the rule can cover necessarily cannot exceed the total universe of available policies available under the statute.²⁴⁵ This is especially so because an agency cannot parrot the statute’s language.²⁴⁶ Thus, regulated parties reading a rule should have more notice of their obligations than regulated parties just reading the statute, even if the rule is ambiguous.²⁴⁷ Of course, one can imagine a rule that is just as expansive as the statute but yet does not parrot the language. In that situation, the amount of notice would be equivalent. But most of the time, a rule should “narrow the scope” of policy space because a rule that exceeds the scope is *ultra vires*.²⁴⁸ Accordingly, in terms of providing prospective guidance to regulated parties, *Chenery II* is inferior to *Seminole Rock*. Hence, to the extent that overruling *Seminole Rock* creates incentives for agencies to forego rulemaking (or at least do so to the degree that the net effect on notice is negative), the Court’s decision would be at cross-purposes with its goal.

It is possible, of course, that agencies in a post-*Seminole Rock* world would still attempt to provide notice to regulated parties. After all, the agency may be wary of tying itself down for future, but that does not mean it does not have a preference now. Yet if the agency does not say anything about what the statute means but instead simply waits until the appropriate time to bring an enforcement action, its ability to direct primary conduct during the interim would be reduced. Thus, the agency may choose to inform regulated parties how it interprets the statute. If *Seminole Rock* were not available, however, such an agency more likely would fall back on guidance documents and the like instead of rules. Guidance documents have some ability to influence conduct, yet they can be changed much more readily than a rule. Accordingly, if *Seminole Rock* were overruled, not only should we expect agencies to rely on adjudication more under *Chenery II*, but we also should expect agencies to rely on guidance documents and the like more than before.

The reason *why* we should expect to see more guidance documents (and other informal signaling devices) should be obvious from the above analysis:

²⁴⁵ See *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (“In *Auer*, the underlying regulations gave specificity to a statutory scheme the Secretary of Labor was charged with enforcing ...”).

²⁴⁶ See, e.g., *id.* at 256-57.

²⁴⁷ See Marisam, *supra* note __, at 303 (explaining that “regulations are typically narrower than enabling statutes” because of the “anti-parroting principle”).

²⁴⁸ *Id.* Of course, with subsequent adjudications, the agency will have to show consistency, or at least explain why the original decision was wrong. But agencies also have to do the same regarding rules. This is just the duty of reasoned decision-making.

guidance documents are also imperfect substitutes for rulemaking.²⁴⁹ In other words, the analysis thus far has been too quick: there are not just two substitutes (rulemaking or adjudication), but in fact there is a spectrum of substitutes.²⁵⁰ It is important to recognize, however, that these informal devices like guidance documents are related to *Chenery II* in a way that goes beyond the fact that both are substitutes for rulemaking. At least in part, the reason regulated parties care about guidance documents where the agency has not promulgated a rule is because *Chenery II* looms in the background. If an agency could not punish regulated parties directly under the statute, but instead could only promulgate rules, regulated parties would have less reason to worry about a guidance document when the agency has not promulgated a rule. As it is now, however, agencies can bring an enforcement action under the statute itself, thus forcing regulated parties to pay attention to the agency's guidance. To be sure, in adjudication, the agency could not simply say "the party has violated the guidance document," for the guidance document would not itself have legal effect. But the agency *could* say "this is how we read the statute itself," and if the reading of the statute was reasonable, the agency would be entitled to prevail under *Chenery II*. Hence, *Chenery II* is the anchor that gives many guidance documents their weight.²⁵¹

There is an important virtue, of course, to informal guidance—it provides notice. As Justice Elena Kagan recently explained at oral argument in an analogous context (jurisdictional determinations under the Clean Water Act), if we were to discourage agencies from providing guidance, the result is that

²⁴⁹ See, e.g., Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007) ("Because it is procedurally easier to issue guidance documents, there also may be an incentive for regulators to issue guidance documents in lieu of regulations.").

²⁵⁰ See, e.g., Bressman, *supra* note __, at 536 ("Furthermore, agencies now choose other methods instead of rulemaking for making policy. They use informal adjudications or enforcement actions against private parties. They use guidance documents or settlement negotiations."). Needless to say, there is abundant literature on guidance documents. This Article does not wade deeply into that literature. It is sufficient to observe that the existence of guidance documents and other informal mechanisms further complicates the anti-*Seminole Rock* critique, for they provide more opportunity for substitution.

²⁵¹ See, e.g., David L. Franklin, *Two Cheers for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents*, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 111, 117 (2012) ("Procedural invalidation of guidance documents is largely ineffective, Professor Seidenfeld argues, because under *Chenery II* the agency could simply apply the same policy in the course of adjudicatory enforcement. Ironically, the same doctrine underlies my own skepticism about the benefits of ex post monitoring: given that agencies may cite the policy embodied in a guidance document in support of an adjudicatory order, I have argued, they are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of being unable to 'rely' on such rules in the strictest legal sense.") (discussing Mark Seidenfeld, *Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents*, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 338 (2011)).

regulated parties would know even *less* about their obligations.²⁵² So if overruling *Seminole Rock* were to lead agencies to provide more guidance documents, perhaps any concerns about notice should fall away. Yet this leads to the second reason why substitution from *Seminole Rock* would be problematic: although providing notice through such means might reduce fair notice concerns, it would do so at the expense of public participation.

There is an important reason why many scholars prefer rulemaking to other forms of policy-making²⁵³: it encourages public involvement in the process in a way that, at least in theory, is better than the alternatives.²⁵⁴ To be sure, adjudication can also be a platform for public participation.²⁵⁵ And no doubt notice-and-comment rulemaking has its faults. Even so, notice-and-comment rulemaking by design allows members of the public to make their best argument in an *orderly* way, and if what the public has to say is material, the agency must respond in a *meaningful* way²⁵⁶—and the agency’s response is subject to judicial review to prevent arbitrary and capricious agency action.²⁵⁷ Regulated parties often prefer notice-and-comment rulemaking to informal agency behavior, especially if an Article III court is waiting in the wings “to impose a salutary discipline” on the agency that “deters casual and sloppy action.”²⁵⁸ Thus, for instance, regulated parties in a recent case challenged the Commodity Future Trading Commission’s failure to conduct a notice-and-comment rulemaking because they wanted to be able to confront the agency’s proposed test.²⁵⁹ That challenge was rejected, however, because the agency’s test was only “guidance.”²⁶⁰ Making rulemaking less attractive,

²⁵² See U.S. Army Corp. of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., No. 15-290 (oral arg. trans.), at 37 (“If the JD process didn’t exist, your client would be facing the exact same predicament. And indeed, the JD’s—the JD process’s reason for being is that it’s supposed to help people in dealing with this information that they otherwise wouldn’t have.”); see also *id.* at 17 (“We think that this helps people, to actually know what the government thinks about particular factual situations.”); *id.* at 28 (“People want to know these things.”).

²⁵³ See, e.g., Bressman, *supra* note __, at 535 (noting “scholars who have recognized the advantages of notice-and-comment rulemaking for issuing general policy”).

²⁵⁴ See, e.g., Sean Croston, *The Petition Is Mightier Than the Sword: Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles over “Regulation Through Guidance,”* 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 381, 384-88 (2011) (explaining some of the problems with guidance documents); Anthony, *supra* note __ (critiquing use of guidance documents).

²⁵⁵ See *supra* Part II.B(1).

²⁵⁶ See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

²⁵⁷ See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

²⁵⁸ Anthony, *supra* note __, at 1374.

²⁵⁹ See *Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC*, 720 F.3d 370, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

²⁶⁰ See *id.* (“As for the seven-factor marketing test, no notice and comment was required. The ... seven factors were included in the rule only as guidance. The rule explicitly states that CFTC ‘will determine whether a violation of the marketing restriction exists on a case by case

accordingly, could reduce public participation in the regulatory process by encouraging more ad hoc agency behavior.

At bottom, overruling *Seminole Rock* on net *could* reduce unfairness. Agencies, for instance, may conclude that the costs of flexibility are too high if the only way to obtain that flexibility is through adjudication or guidance documents, and so may opt to promulgate rules with less ambiguity. Indeed, economics suggests that both would happen; some ambiguous rules in a world without *Seminole Rock* would become clear rules, while others would become no rules at all. Because agencies promulgate ambiguous rules, however, it appears that they sometimes put a high value on flexibility (or at least are not willing to expend the resources necessary to eliminate ambiguity, which in effect may not be that different). Yet ultimately, as explained above, this is an empirical question. It is sufficient here to observe that before overruling *Seminole Rock*, the Court should understand that doing so may result in outcomes that, on the Court's own terms, are worse than retaining the status quo. Uncertainty on this score makes *stare decisis* more attractive. Counterintuitively, moreover, if agencies do behave as strategically as some critics of *Seminole Rock* suggest, the argument for *stare decisis* may be even stronger because strategic agencies presumably would be even more willing to substitute to adjudication if *Seminole Rock* were no longer available.

IV. LOOKING BEYOND *SEMINOLE ROCK*

Administrative law is an interconnected network of doctrines. If one part of the network is changed, it has repercussions throughout the network. Thus, overruling *Seminole Rock* will have consequences for the usage of *Chenery II*. Because these two doctrines are substitutes, albeit imperfect ones, if *Seminole Rock* were removed from the menu of options, *Chenery II* would become more attractive, at least at the margins—especially for agencies that place a high value on future flexibility. Whether the benefits of overruling *Seminole Rock* are outweighed by the costs of doing so thus depends, in large part, on the answer to this question: Would agencies, on net, promulgate clearer regulations if they could not invoke *Seminole Rock*, or would they more often fall back on ad hoc adjudication, with the lack of clarity that entails? The answer to that question is an empirical one, and sadly, no one knows it.

In light of this uncertainty about the post-*Seminole Rock* world, what should the Supreme Court do? There are at least three options. The Court could overrule *Seminole Rock* and do nothing about *Chenery II*; not overrule anything; or overrule *Seminole Rock* and do something about *Chenery II*. For

basis through an examination of the relevant facts.”) (citation omitted).

all the reasons explained above, the first option could be the worst one—if *Chenery II* remains unchanged, it may be better to retain *Seminole Rock* because even an ambiguous rule is often better than no rule. Before the Supreme Court overrules *Seminole Rock*, accordingly, it must consider these substitution effects. This key insight thus cuts in favor of *stare decisis*.

The third option, however, may also be a good one, for two reasons. First, it would work. As part of revisiting *Seminole Rock*, the Court could also take steps to prevent substitution from rulemaking to adjudication. For instance, the Court could replace *Chevron* deference with *Skidmore* deference for adjudications and bolster the fair notice doctrine. And second, these changes would not require a dramatic doctrinal overhaul. At the same time, importantly, the Court would not have to overrule the core of *Chenery II*.

A. How to Minimize *Chenery II*'s Substitution Effects.

If the Court is inclined to overrule *Seminole Rock*, it must confront *Chenery II*. In particular, two changes could mitigate the substitution effects that would occur if *Seminole Rock* were overruled.²⁶¹ First, the Court could begin affording *Skidmore* deference to legal interpretations announced in adjudications, regardless of whether the interpretation involves a regulation or a statute. And second, the Court could refine the fair notice doctrine. These two changes would allow agencies to obtain many of the benefits of *Chenery II* while at the same mitigating its dangers. In this part of the Article, I explain

²⁶¹ Of course, other changes may be possible too. For instance, ala *Chenery I*, one could require agencies to contemporaneously explain why they opted to not promulgate a rule, with that explanation being subject to arbitrary-and-capricious review. Cf. Bressman, *supra* note __, at 553 (“It is possible here, as there, to introduce a preference for notice-and-comment rulemaking to the choice of procedures. This solution would demand that an agency fill any residual or subsidiary gaps in their regulations the same way it issued the regulation—through rulemaking—*unless it justifies the use of other interpretive means.*”) (emphasis added). One problem with this solution is that it may require courts to wade into waters for which they are not well suited; after all, myriad factors influence why an agency chooses one form of policy over another, *see, e.g.*, Magill, *supra* note __, and evaluating an agency’s reasoning on this score may be difficult for generalist judge, *cf.* Manning II, *supra* note __, at 909-10 (“Whatever one thinks of the relative merits of rulemaking versus adjudication, I think it safe to doubt the possibility of devising a judicially manageable standard for triggering mandatory rulemaking. Even if one were able to identify a criterion for mandatory rulemaking ... any effort to require an agency to use rulemaking rather than adjudication might draw the judiciary into unmanageable questions of degree.”). Another possibility is that the mitigation measure should vary with the danger of substitution, i.e., those agencies in which substitution appears most likely should receive *Skidmore* deference while other would continue to receive *Chevron* deference. Analytically, this would be worth exploring, though, at least at first blush, I fear a context-specific test would not be administrable.

why these two changes would work; in the next part, I explain why they would not require a major doctrinal overhaul.

1. Replacing *Chevron* with *Skidmore* in Adjudication.

The first revision to the *Chenery II* regime involves modifying the deference framework. To see why this would help curb the dangers of *Chenery II*, return again to the *Chevron* Scenario in Part II. In that scenario, if *Seminole Rock* was off the table and the agency valued flexibility, it might elect to use *Chenery II* to not promulgate a regulation at all.

The reason an agency would act this way is straightforward. Under current law, an agency acting through adjudication can pick almost any policy permitted by the statute. That is why *Seminole Rock* generally provides more notice than *Chenery II*; with *Seminole Rock*, the policy space is *somewhat* limited. Even ambiguous rule narrow the scope of policy discretion.

If the Court were to switch to *Skidmore* deference, however, the agency would be limited to the reading of the statute that is most persuasive.²⁶² This is a lesser form of deference than *Chevron*.²⁶³ Hence, although still providing the agency with some flexibility, a *Skidmore* standard would narrow the scope of policy discretion and therefore place regulated parties on greater notice of their obligations. Yet at the same time, agencies would still be able to prevent parties from violating the most reasonable reading of the statute without needing to promulgate a rule—thus retaining an important part of *Chenery II*. It would only be when the agency’s interpretation is not apparent even with the benefit of *Skidmore* that *Chenery II* would be curtailed.²⁶⁴

To be sure, although this revision would not eliminate the ability to make policy through adjudication, it would limit it. But some curtailment may be a virtue because doing so would encourage notice-and-comment rulemaking, which even *Chenery II* agrees should be the favored procedure.²⁶⁵ Moreover, as explained below, a lot of agency innovation does not occur within the *Chevron* framework at all because some statutes—like those that authorize regulation “in the public interest”—do not present meaningful questions of

²⁶² See Manning, *supra* note __, at 618 (explaining *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 142 (1944)).

²⁶³ See *id.*

²⁶⁴ See Manning II, *supra* note __, at 938-39 (“From an agency’s perspective, if *Skidmore*’s (nonbinding) form of deference appears less advantageous than that which is available under *Chevron*, then agency administrators may have at least some reason to resort to more formal modes of policy expression.”).

²⁶⁵ See *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”).

statutory interpretation. Thus, for all the reasons that Manning urges the Court to replace *Seminole Rock* deference with *Skidmore* deference when it comes to interpreting regulations in adjudication,²⁶⁶ the Court could do the same when it comes to interpreting statutes in adjudications. Such a shift would eliminate some of the most problematic substitution while nonetheless still allowing agencies to act by adjudication to effectuate the most persuasive interpretations of their legal instruments, whether they be statutes or rules.

2. A Refined Fair Notice Doctrine.

As explained in Part II, however, the Non-*Chevron* Scenario must also be considered. Some statutes do not meaningfully present “*Chevron*” questions. The statute in *Chenery II* itself, for instance, is a good example. It essentially said that the SEC could regulate “in the public interest.”²⁶⁷ Shifting to *Skidmore* deference for that sort of statute would not mitigate the substitution effects that would result if *Seminole Rock* were overruled. With such a “public interest” statute, at least in terms of providing notice, an ambiguous rule is superior to adjudication under the statute itself because a rule provides at least some insight into how the agency will use its discretion. Indeed, a standard like “generally fair and equitable”²⁶⁸ provides almost no notice at all regarding how the agency at issue will actually use its delegated power.

What can be done to mitigate substitution with a statute like this? The most promising solution is to bolster the fair notice doctrine. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. After all, *Chenery II* contains a nod towards fair notice.²⁶⁹ But the Court also recognized that every adjudication, in a sense, involves making law.²⁷⁰ How then to sort out “fair” and “unfair” retroactivity? The line-drawing problems created by the fair notice doctrine are real. For a moment, however, set those problems aside and assume that courts are willing and capable of more vigorously enforcing the fair notice doctrine.

In a world with bolstered fair notice, there would be policies that agencies could select through rulemaking that they could not announce in

²⁶⁶ See Manning, *supra* note __, at 618.

²⁶⁷ Cf. *Chenery*, 332 U.S. at 204 (authoring the agency to regulate in “fair and equitable” ways consistent with “the public interest”) (citations omitted).

²⁶⁸ See *Yakus v. United States*, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (upholding delegation of power “to promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities which ‘in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act’”) (citation omitted).

²⁶⁹ See *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).

²⁷⁰ See *id.*; see also *e.g.*, *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“A certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action.”).

adjudication—or at least not announce with retroactive effect. This point must be true or else the fair notice doctrine would do no work. Accordingly, fair notice principles could tame the most problematic substitution from *Seminole Rock*. In fact, in a sense, the analysis is conceptually no different from switching to *Skidmore* deference. With either mitigation device, the scope of what an agency could do in adjudication would be limited, thus encouraging the agency to engage in rulemaking. At the same time, so long as the agency’s experimentation is not too extreme, an agency could still use adjudication to formulate policy, thus retaining the core of *Chenery II*. But the *range* of the experimentation would be curtailed.

B. Why Taming *Chenery II* Finds Support in Precedent.

Beyond the fact that these two revisions to *Chenery II* would mitigate the most problematic substitution from *Seminole Rock*, the other point in their favor is that doing so would not require a dramatic overhaul. Because *stare decisis* is an important concern, it is significant that *Chenery II* can be revised without being overruled. Indeed, *Chenery II* should not be overruled outright because even aside from *stare decisis* concerns, it serves an important function and often is not problematic. After all, for all the reasons given by the *Chenery II* Court itself, sometimes it makes sense to engage in case-by-case adjudication. Thus, there definitely is a place for the *Chenery II* doctrine.²⁷¹

Yet although *Chenery II* should not be overruled, it can and should be limited in such a way that preserves its core while preventing the most problematic substitution that would occur if *Seminole Rock* were overruled.²⁷² Moreover, the reality is that subsequent doctrinal developments have already begun to undermine any basis for a maximalist view of *Chenery II*.

1. Applying *Skidmore* Deference in Adjudication.

Revising *Chenery II* to incorporate *Skidmore* deference finds at least some support in existing law. To begin, there is a plausible historical argument for the switch. When Congress enacted the APA in 1946, after all,

²⁷¹ See, e.g., Weaver & Jellum, *supra* note __, at 824-27 (explaining advantages).

²⁷² See, e.g., *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective.”).

Skidmore (arguably) was the law. At an absolute minimum, deference doctrines were muddled.²⁷³ Thus, it is not obvious that *Chevron* was the law Congress implicitly adopted for adjudications. Indeed, given the APA's text, it is more likely that Congress had something like *Skidmore* in mind.²⁷⁴

Moreover, perhaps the status of *Chevron* when it comes to adjudications *should* be on shakier ground.²⁷⁵ The Supreme Court's decision in *Mead* illustrates that the Court is less comfortable with *Chevron* in adjudication, especially when adjudication is informal.²⁷⁶ Importantly, the Court has held that informal adjudications that do not receive *Chevron* deference receive *Skidmore* deference.²⁷⁷ In other words, the Court has already begun to draw the very line that I am proposing. This means that to mitigate the substitution effects that overruling *Seminole Rock* would prompt, all the Court would have to do is extend a line it has already drawn. Obviously, this Article is not the place for a full examination of *Mead*. But it is worth pausing to consider why the Court was less comfortable with *Chevron* deference in adjudication.

Although more provocative, one could also argue that there is little reason to distinguish the "flaws" in *Seminole Rock* from the flaws inherent in a maximalist reading of *Chenery II*.²⁷⁸ In particular, criticism of *Seminole Rock* boils down to the idea that it is contrary to a separation-of-powers maxim: the same hands should not both make and interpret the law. With that maxim in mind, the anti-*Seminole Rock* argument seems to proceed as follows: Because (1) the "same hands" principle is so venerable; (2) Congress has not explicitly given such power to agencies; and (3) *Seminole Rock* creates bad

²⁷³ See, e.g., Bamzai, *supra* note __ (discussing history of deference doctrines, including *NLRB v. Hearst Publications*, 322 U.S. 111 (1944)).

²⁷⁴ Cf. *Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n*, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the text of the APA and how it relates to deference).

²⁷⁵ See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, *supra* note __, at 879 n.239 ("Requiring that courts give mandatory deference to interpretations announced in adjudications is also open to objection on the ground that it inverts the position of the courts in a system of separation of powers. The Supreme Court does not defer to legal interpretations of courts of appeals, at least in the strong *Chevron* sense, nor do courts of appeals defer to legal interpretations by district courts. Yet, if we extend *Chevron* to legal interpretations announced by agencies in adjudications, in effect a judicial tribunal that has been given the power to review an agency tribunal is required to defer to reasonable interpretations adopted by the tribunal subject to review.").

²⁷⁶ See *United States v. Mead Corp.* 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) ("We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under *Chevron*, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but we hold that under *Skidmore* ..., the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness.").

²⁷⁷ See *id.*

²⁷⁸ To be clear, this argument assumes that the Supreme Court *would* conclude that *Seminole Rock* has flaws. Whether the Supreme Court *should* make such a holding is a question that others have tackled and exceeds the scope of this Article.

incentives, it follows that courts should not presume that Congress authorized *Seminole Rock* deference—even though, presumably, it would not be unconstitutional for Congress to explicitly do so. In other words, if Congress wants such a peculiar regime, it must say so.²⁷⁹

Much of this argument, however, is not limited to *Seminole Rock*. After all, there are *other* venerable principles at play when agencies are given authority to retroactively interpret legal texts. As the Supreme Court explained in *Christopher*, “[i]t is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them,” but “it is quite another to require regulated parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference.”²⁸⁰ Nothing about the Court’s point turns on whether the agency is interpreting a regulation or a statute. The “same hands” principle thus is only an illustration of a deeper principle: “those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”²⁸¹

Put another way, there is no reason why violating the “same hands” principle, *in itself*, is problematic from a separation-of-powers perspective, so long as it is not tied to retroactivity. Indeed, if an agency can “make law” through rulemaking, why can’t it also “make law” by interpreting its own rule? The act of interpretation (i.e., sitting down and reading the rule and then issuing a declaration what it means), after all, could be conceptualized as just another form of rulemaking. For instance, Congress could create a new rulemaking procedure—call it Rulemaking Lite—that applies when a rule is being amended, for instance to more readily enable agencies to cut off unintended consequences as they emerge. Rulemaking Lite would not require another round of notice-and-comment rulemaking; instead, so long as the new rule does not “significantly depart from the existing regulatory text,” the agency could just put the new legislative rule directly in the Federal Register. But a rule promulgated under Rulemaking Lite, like most other rules, would be prospective only.²⁸² Rulemaking Lite may be bad policy,²⁸³ but surely it

²⁷⁹ See Manning, *supra* note __, at 637 (“If a court must assign meaning to an agency-ordaining or agency-regulating statute in the face of legislative indeterminacy, it should presume, absent a clear indication to the contrary, that the statute opts for an arrangement that best conforms to the basic structural commitments of our constitutional scheme.”).

²⁸⁰ *Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).

²⁸¹ Antonin Scalia, *The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules*, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989); see also *S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 217 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“This seems to me to undervalue and to belittle the place of law, even in the system of administrative justice. It calls to mind Mr. Justice Cardozo’s statement that ‘Law as a guide to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility if it is unknown and unknowable.’”).

²⁸² See *Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.*, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (explaining that the

would not pose a separation-of-powers problem. Accordingly, it is apparent that the label “interpretation” is conceptually empty since the procedures for “amendment” could simply mirror those for “interpretation.”

The deep problem with *Seminole Rock*, therefore, cannot be that the agency is interpreting its own rule. Instead, the problem must be that the agency is doing so *with retroactive effect*. This matters because once we realize that the separation-of-powers concern, at its core, is retroactivity, there is no reason why the same sort of anti-*Seminole Rock* argument sketched out above (i.e., that Congress has not clearly approved such deference and it is contrary to traditional principles, plus it produces bad consequences by incentivizing ambiguity) would not also apply to *Chevron* in adjudications. It is myopic to focus on the fact that the same hands are making and interpreting law when the reason why we care that the same hands are making and interpreting the law—namely, retroactivity—is not limited to that circumstance.

In any event, the overlap between *Chenery II* and *Seminole Rock* may go beyond retroactivity. Modern scholarship suggests that agencies often author the very statutes they administer²⁸⁴—including, presumably, sometimes the ambiguities in them. Indeed, agency assistance is ubiquitous, at least for “technical” matters.²⁸⁵ Yet might agency drafting go beyond mere “technical” assistance? In “friendly” situations (for instance, if the same political party controls Congress and the White House), it is obvious that the dynamics of the legislative process changes.²⁸⁶ Even more provocative, Brigham Daniels has argued that even in “unfriendly” situations agencies may dictate the content of legislation, for instance if the agency has leverage over Congress.²⁸⁷ To be sure, this sort of analysis merits a full article of its own.

dividing line between rulemaking and adjudication is prospectivity).

²⁸³ Of course, the fact that adjudication may allow an agency to avoid the procedural rigors of rulemaking may also be problematic. *See, e.g.*, Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note ___, at 1464. But that is not a *separation-of-powers* problem; Congress could fix that problem by changing the procedural burdens. The “same hands” problem is different in kind.

²⁸⁴ *See, e.g.*, Shobe, *supra* note __.

²⁸⁵ *See* Christopher J. Walker, *LEGISLATING IN THE SHADOWS* (forthcoming); CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, *FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN STATUTORY DRAFTING* (Admin. Conf. of U.S. ed., 2015).

²⁸⁶ *See, e.g.*, Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, Note, *Twisting the President's Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure*, 100 *YALE L.J.* 209, 219 (1990) (“Not surprisingly, the proposal and rejection rate of rescissions is primarily a function of whether the Presidency and Congress are controlled by the same political party.”).

²⁸⁷ *See, e.g.*, Daniels, *supra* note ___, at 340 (“[T]o accept this Article’s thesis all that is required is that we agree that, at some point along the spectrum, agencies are manipulating the

But for purposes here, it at least begins to suggest that the anti-*Seminole Rock* argument may apply to statutes too.

Finally, of course, there are other arguments in favor of *Skidmore* deference in adjudications²⁸⁸—arguments that have nothing to do with the insights of this Article. For instance, there often is no notice-and-comment procedure in adjudication, meaning that there also is less public participation and consideration of arguments. The fact that *Chevron* in adjudication is already on less sure footing than *Chevron* in rulemaking, combined with the retroactivity insights of this article, should lessen the force of *stare decisis*.

But to be clear, an agency should still be able to enforce its statute directly when doing so is consistent with at least a *Skidmore* reading of the statute. In that sense, *Chenery II* can and should remain good law.²⁸⁹ But if an agency wants to interpret a law to mean something that requires *more* than *Skidmore* deference, requiring it to go through rulemaking would mitigate *Seminole Rock*'s substitution effects while also finding support in law.

2. The Supreme Court Has Already Begun to Enforce Fair Notice.

The more difficult scenario, however, does not involve interpretative deference. Instead, it is a scenario like *Chenery II* itself, which does not really present an interpretation question at all. Instead, such a scenario boils down a policy question: what is in “the public interest”? For agencies that administer such open-ended statutes, adjudication under the statute itself via *Chenery II* would become more attractive if *Seminole Rock* were overruled, but switching to *Skidmore* deference would do nothing to mitigate that substitution.

The best solution is to bolster the fair notice doctrine. At a minimum, “the test for retroactivity” should not “be more stringent in the context of regulatory (as opposed to statutory) interpretation,” contrary to what some courts believe.²⁹⁰ In *Christopher*, the Supreme Court began to try to further cement fair notice principles in the context of *Seminole Rock*.²⁹¹ Because

elected branches rather than the other way around. Particularly when one uses a situational principal-agent theory model, which paints principals as those capable of exerting control, one is hard pressed to come up with a reason not to include administrative agencies as potential principals over the elected branches.”).

²⁸⁸ See, e.g., Walker & Barnett, *supra* note ___. Cf. *Rapanos v. United States*, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting greater willingness to defer to agency interpretations announced through notice-and-comment rulemaking).

²⁸⁹ See, e.g., *NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC*, 548 F.3d 116, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We have never applied the fair notice doctrine in a case where the agency’s interpretation is the most natural one.”).

²⁹⁰ See Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note ___, at 1479.

²⁹¹ See, e.g., Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, *The Enduring and Universal*

Chenery II and *Seminole Rock* can be substitutes, however, such fair notice concerns should not be limited to interpretations of regulations.

The difficulty, of course, is that relying on fair notice to solve this problem would present frustrating line-drawing problems. The Court tends to avoid sorting out questions of degree rather than of kind.²⁹² Nonetheless, the doctrinal pieces are there for the Court to begin trimming back *Chenery II*, especially if doing so does not require overruling *Chenery II* altogether. For instance, the actual judgment in *Chenery II*—though not the principle that agencies should have discretion to choose its policy-making procedure—seems suspect in light of *Christopher*'s fair notice concerns, at least if *Christopher* is read broadly. And such a broad reading of *Christopher* may be necessary if the goal is to prevent substitution should *Seminole Rock* be overruled. Indeed, if courts continue to apply fair notice as the Court did in *Chenery II*, it is hard to see why agencies bent on flexibility would *not* gravitate to adjudication if *Seminole Rock* were no longer an option.

Accordingly, if fair notice—like “minimum contacts,”²⁹³ “reasonable expectations of privacy,”²⁹⁴ “proportionality analysis,”²⁹⁵ and other legal doctrines that necessitate tricky line-drawing—were developed into a more meaningful doctrine through repeated applications and refinements, it may offer the best path forward, especially if the Court were to also recognize that clarifying uncertainty with retroactive effect—even without a *change* of agency policy—can also be problematic when it comes to principles of fair notice. The line between “change” and “clarification” is itself a question of degree more than kind and at least sometimes it can be unfair to make

Principle of “Fair Notice,” 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194 (2013).

²⁹² See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, *supra* note __, at 1470 (“Courts have sometimes expressed concern about agencies relying overmuch on adjudication, and some prominent judges and justices have tried to insist that certain kinds of general decisions must be made through rulemaking. But the Supreme Court has consistently rejected that suggestion, in part because of the difficulty of deciding how specific a preexisting statutory or regulatory command must be before an agency can properly give it more definite content in an individualized adjudication.”); cf. *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (“[W]e have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing ... the law.”).

²⁹³ See, e.g., *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753-58 (2014) (discussing evolution of “minimum contracts” test from *Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

²⁹⁴ See, e.g., *United States v. Jones*, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“*Katz*’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded it.”) (citing *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 36 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); *id.* at 959-60 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing evolution of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard).

²⁹⁵ *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (explaining the Court’s “proportionality analysis”).

members of the public predict potential regulatory outcomes. After all, bounded rationality limits the ability of agency officials and the regulated alike to foresee the future and the residual risk inherent in the concept of bounded rationality should not necessarily always fall on the latter rather than the former. Likewise, perhaps it should be easier for agencies to announce policies in adjudications but not apply those policies retroactively.²⁹⁶

Whenever one discusses fair notice, of course, the problem arises that some cases of agency adjudication involve private parties on both sides. This is why it is easier to impose a fair notice doctrine in the context of civil penalties.²⁹⁷ For instance, imagine there are employees on one hand and a company on other on the other and each has a different view regarding how to count time for purposes of compensation. No matter what the agency decides, its decision will have retroactive effect as to one party.²⁹⁸ This reality complicates any effort to bolster fair notice principles. Nonetheless, although the question is one of degree rather than kind, at some point a position adopted by an agency can be so far from what appeared to be likely *ex ante* that it is hard to credibly say that retroactivity is fair, even if there are private parties on both sides of the dispute.²⁹⁹ Again, as with determining whether procedural due process was satisfied, this is the sort of question that may require common law evolution through repeated applications.³⁰⁰

Put it another way, neither the majority nor the dissent in *Chenery II* struck the right balance. The *Chenery II* majority failed to adequately appreciate the dangers of retroactivity. But at the same time, the *Chenery II* majority was right to recognize that agencies should be able to make policy in adjudication. The question thus should not be *whether* such retroactivity is ever permissible, but rather *how much* should be permissible, which requires a more nuanced appraisal of fair notice. By contrast, Justice Jackson erred by suggesting that agencies should never be allowed to make policy through adjudication, even though he was right to worry about retroactivity.

²⁹⁶ See, e.g., Manning, *supra* note ___, at 670, & n.281 (collecting cases).

²⁹⁷ See *id.* & n.281.

²⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC*, 509 F.3d 531, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining that “[e]very case of first impression has a retroactive effect” and often “every loss that retroactive application ... would inflict on [one party] is matched by an equal and opposite loss that non-retroactivity would inflict on” another).

²⁹⁹ Cf. *NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC*, 548 F.3d 116, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (focusing on whose reading was the “most natural”).

³⁰⁰ Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, *The Rule of Law as a Law of Law*, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483, 497 (2014) (noting the many standards in the rule of law and explaining that just because there are no bright lines does not mean there should not be enforcement); Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he inherent difficulty of line-drawing is no excuse for not enforcing the Constitution.”).

Of course, absent the substitution effects that would result from overruling *Seminole Rock*, there is reason to leave the law of *Chenery II* alone. On the other hand, if the Court is going to overrule *Seminole Rock*, the *stare decisis* analysis for *Chenery II* should also change, because overruling *Seminole Rock* would increase the doctrinal pressures placed on *Chenery II*. If *Chenery II* creates unfairness now, it would create even more unfairness if *Seminole Rock* were overruled. This matters because even if one were to conclude that the total unfairness that *Chenery II* currently produces is not enough by itself to outweigh *stare decisis*, if that total were to increase because of substitution effects, the *stare decisis* math may change.³⁰¹

CONCLUSION

In principle, few disagree that “an agency whose powers are not limited either by meaningful statutory standards or ... legislative rules poses a serious potential threat to liberty and to democracy.”³⁰² Yet in application, one of the most vexing questions in administrative law is how to prevent the emergence of such agencies without crippling the operations of the regulatory state. In fact, preventing discretion from being abused without at the same time smothering it such that it cannot be leveraged even when its benefits outweigh its costs is the “perennial question” in administrative law.³⁰³

Critics of *Seminole Rock* believe that overruling that form of deference is a step in the right direction. The key takeaway of this Article, however, is that it is not at all certain that overruling *Seminole Rock* would fix anything—even on those critics’ own terms. Rather, depending on how much agencies value flexibility, doing so may actually make the problem worse. This uncertainty counsels in favor of *stare decisis*. Yet if *Seminole Rock* is to be overruled, the Court should also revisit *Chenery II* by, for instance, applying *Skidmore* deference to interpretations announced in adjudications and by bolstering the

³⁰¹ It is worth noting that taming *Chenery II* may lead agencies to look for yet *other* substitutes like guidance documents. As explained above, however, *Chenery II* serves as the anchor for many such informal devices. *See supra* ___. The reason regulated parties obey the agency’s “guidance” even if the agency has not promulgated a rule is because the agency can fall back on adjudication. By the same token, if the agency has promulgated a rule, agencies pay heed to guidance documents in large part because of *Seminole Rock*. If the regulation itself were clear, the guidance document would do no work. Thus, overruling *Seminole Rock* and limiting *Chenery II* should be expected make it more difficult for agencies to substitute to another policymaking device.

³⁰² *Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala* (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 K. DAVIS & R. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 11.5, p. 204 (3d ed. 1994)).

³⁰³ Kagan, *supra* note ___, at 2254.

fair notice doctrine. As a practical matter, these revisions would encourage more specific rules and prevent substitution from *Seminole Rock*. As a conceptual matter, both find support in law. In short, if the Court wishes to solve the deep problem, it must look beyond *Seminole Rock*.