![]()
Ronald A. Cass, Dean Emeritus, Boston University School of Law
Executive Summary: Decisions about how and how much to embrace civil service protections are, for the most part, political choices, not constitutional imperatives. The Constitution gives the President control over principal officers in the executive branch and by implication control as well over subordinates, but it doesn’t prevent employment restrictions that advance important goals without significantly interfering with that control.
The most trenchant policy questions for potential civil service reform are: whether increasing presidential control over employees will improve government—by making it more democratically responsive—and whether greater executive control of executive branch decisions will increase or decrease legislative commitments of broad policymaking authority to executive officials.
Expanding the ambit of presidential influence over personnel is desirable, to counteract significant impediments that currently undermine the executive’s effective constitutional responsibility for government officials, particularly in light of the small number of senior officials now subject to direct presidential control. Significant practical concerns, however, will limit the scope of personnel subject to increased controls. And restricting the scope of executive branch policymaking power—likely to occur on statutory and constitutional grounds—should moderate concerns over expanded presidential authority.
PB24_03_Cass-4
